Killing in the Fog of War by unknown
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Legal Philosophy between State and
Transnationalism Seminar Series Seminars
1-27-2012
Killing in the Fog of War
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
transnationalism_series
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Seminars at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legal
Philosophy between State and Transnationalism Seminar Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
"Killing in the Fog of War" (2012). Legal Philosophy between State and Transnationalism Seminar Series. 12.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/transnationalism_series/12
DRAFT ONLY NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION  
 
 
KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR 
ADIL AHMAD HAQUE† 
 
ABSTRACT   
How certain must a soldier be that a given individual is a 
combatant and not a civilian before attacking that individual?  In the 
absence of clear legal rules, leading states, scholars, and practitioners have 
embraced a Balancing Approach, according to which the required level of 
certainty varies with the balance of military and humanitarian 
considerations.  However, the Balancing Approach ignores the moral 
asymmetries between killing and letting die and between intentionally and 
unintentionally killing civilians.  As a result, the Balancing Approach 
permits soldiers to intentionally kill individuals who are probably, much 
more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants.  
This article develops a deontological alternative to the Balancing 
Approach.  According to Deontological Targeting, a soldier may not 
intentionally kill an individual whom she believes is a civilian or whom she 
does not reasonably believe is a combatant.  These constraints establish a 
minimum threshold of certainty that soldiers must reach before using 
deadly force.  Furthermore, if an individual does not pose an immediate 
threat then, except in rare cases, that individual may not be attacked unless 
there is conclusive reason to believe that she is a combatant.  In addition, 
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soldiers must seek additional information regarding potential human targets 
unless seeking additional information would increase the risk to the 
soldiers substantially more than acquiring additional information would 
decrease the risk to civilians.  If soldiers are unwilling or unable to take the 
risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty then they must 
hold their fire.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar 
difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be 
planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not 
infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives 
to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural 
appearance.1 
 
The point is that we're Marines.  We're the toughest guys 
on the block.  We know how to defend ourselves.  We know 
how to aggressively take people down.  And to suggest that 
we can't do the shades of gray in between is a cop-out, and 
I think it sells Marines short.2   
 
Imagine that you are a soldier, ordered to protect a military or 
diplomatic convoy as it passes through hostile territory, and you see a car 
stopped by the side of the road ahead.  Or imagine that you are stationed at 
a security checkpoint and a car approaches despite signs and warnings 
directing it to stop.  The occupants of the car may be civilians, but they 
may also be irregular forces waiting to attack.  Or imagine that you are 
sitting safely in an office, or on an airbase, piloting an Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) by remote control, trying to determine whether the 
individuals you see on your monitor are members of an implacable 
insurgency or merely locals carrying arms for their own protection in a 
dangerous area.  Finally, imagine that you are the President of the United 
States and that a team of intelligence analysts informs you that they are 
“between forty and sixty per cent” confident that Al Qaeda leader Osama 
bin Laden is living in a residential compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 
surrounded by civilians.3   
                                                            
1 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR Book 2, Chapter 2, Paragraph 24. 
2 Interview with Col. John Ewers, Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Marine Expeditionary 
Force, FRONTLINE: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, PBS (Feb. 19, 2008), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha/etc/script.html#ixzz1eBd8soBh.   
3 Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden: What happened that night in Abbottabad, 
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What should you do?  How certain must you be that the individuals 
in front of you are opposing combatants, rather than civilians, before using 
deadly force?  What precautions must you take, what information must you 
seek, and what risks must you accept in order to reduce the risk of 
mistakenly killing civilians?  How can the law of armed conflict, as well as 
the rules of engagement promulgated by your armed forces, provide better 
guidance to you as you make such determinations?  
The urgency and importance of such questions is particularly clear 
in irregular armed conflicts in which state armed forces face non-uniformed 
adversaries intermingled with civilian populations.  Moreover, recent 
scholarship suggests that as many as 7 out of 10 civilian deaths caused by 
U.S. armed forces in pre-planned military operations result from a failure to 
verify that the target of the operation is military rather than civilian.4  
Finally, the advent of UAVs creates an unprecedented opportunity to 
submit target verification to determinate and morally defensible legal rules.   
To provide moral and legal guidance to participants in 
contemporary conflicts, this article deploys concepts and theories drawn 
from the law of armed conflict, decision theory, criminal law, and moral 
philosophy.  It is, in that sense, a work of both intradisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship.   
As Part I explains, under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), also 
known as international humanitarian law (IHL), soldiers are not permitted 
to shoot first and ask questions later.  On the contrary, soldiers must 
distinguish between opposing combatants and civilians; do everything 
feasible to verify that the individuals they target are combatants and not 
civilians; consider individuals to be civilians in cases of doubt; and hold 
their fire if it becomes apparent that a targeted individual is a civilian.  
However, as the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)—a 
leading expositor of IHL—has commented, “the various provisions are 
relatively imprecise and are open to a fairly broad margin of judgment.”5  
In the absence of clear legal rules, the ICRC as well as several leading 
states, scholars, and practitioners embrace what I will call ‘the Balancing 
Approach’, according to which the required level of certainty varies with 
the balance of military and humanitarian considerations.  As the balance 
                                                            
4 Gregory S. McNeal, The U.S. Practice of Collateral Damage Estimation and 
Mitigation (unpublished).   
5 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 679 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter 
Protocol I Commentary].   
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tips in favor of humanitarian considerations, the required level of certainty 
rises; as the balance tips in favor of military considerations, the required 
level of certainty falls.   
As Part II explains, the Balancing Approach remains imprecise and 
undertheorized.  To date, no proponent of the Balancing Approach has 
attempted to show how one could derive a specific level of certainty from 
the balance of military and humanitarian considerations.  Interestingly, 
decision theory provides a method for deriving a precise level of certainty 
from the relative costs of an erroneous decision.  Unfortunately, by making 
the Balancing Approach more precise we also reveal its serious flaws.  
Most dramatically, the Balancing Approach ignores the moral asymmetries 
between killing and letting die and between intentionally and 
unintentionally killing civilians.  As a result, the Balancing Approach 
permits soldiers to intentionally kill individuals who are probably, much 
more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants.  
Part III develops an alternative approach to target verification that I 
call ‘Deontological Targeting’.  The moral and legal prohibition of 
intentionally killing civilians entails that it is impermissible for a soldier to 
intentionally kill an individual whom she believes is a civilian or whom she 
believes is probably a civilian.  Most importantly, I argue that it is both 
unjustifiable and inexcusable for a soldier to intentionally kill a human 
being whom she does not reasonably believe is a combatant.  Reasonable 
belief that an individual is a combatant therefore constitutes a minimum 
threshold of certainty that soldiers must achieve before using deadly force.  
Above the reasonable belief threshold, the required level of certainty 
reflects the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die.  Except in 
rare cases, an individual who does not pose an immediate threat may not be 
attacked unless there is conclusive reason to believe that she is a 
combatant.  I conclude by comparing my approach with a recent proposal 
by Lt. Col. Geoffrey Corn.   
Part IV argues that soldiers must accept any personal or operational 
risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty.  If soldiers are 
unable to reach the required level of certainty, or if they are unwilling to 
accept the risks necessary to do so, then they must hold their fire even if 
their forbearance will leave them at greater risk.  Soldiers also have a 
general moral obligation to take additional precautions to avoid mistakenly 
killing civilians, including acquiring additional information regarding 
potential targets, unless taking those precautions would increase the risk to 
the soldiers substantially more than taking those precautions would 
decrease the risk the soldiers impose on civilians.  In developing the latter 
argument I engage critically with important recent work by David Luban.   
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Part V distills the moral principles defended in the previous 
sections into new LOAC/IHL rules as well as reinterpretations of existing 
LOAC/IHL rules.  These legal rules are then translated into model Rules of 
Engagement for training soldiers and guiding their conduct on the 
battlefield.  Properly trained soldiers generally will make better decisions 
by following these simplified rules than by following existing law or by 
attempting to engage in complex moral or legal reasoning while under fire.  
U.S. Rules of Engagement, which typically require ‘Positive Identification’ 
of targets with ‘a reasonable certainty’ are constructively criticized.   
The proposed reforms provide civilians far more protection than 
they have received in recent asymmetric conflicts.  Among other things, the 
reforms preclude ‘firing blind’ into cars, crowds, or dwellings; the creation 
of ‘free-fire’ zones as well as the declaration that an entire area or building 
is ‘hostile’ and on that basis killing its occupants without positively 
identifying each targeted individual as a combatant; as well as the ‘zero-
risk’ policy of shelling buildings on the mere suspicion that the individuals 
inside are combatants without taking meaningful steps to find out.  Neither 
force protection nor mission success can justify or excuse killing civilians 
in these circumstances.   
No set of legal rules can replace human judgment, eliminate human 
error, or prevent armed conflict from claiming civilian lives.  However, the 
proposed reforms provide superior guidance to commanders and soldiers as 
well as greater protection to civilians.  If such progress is possible then it 
must be pursued.    
* * * 
 Two points of clarification are necessary before we begin.  First, 
the moral principles defended and the legal rules proposed in this article 
apply to all participants in armed conflict who must determine whether an 
individual is a legitimate target or an illegitimate target.6  However, for the 
sake of convenience, this article generally refers to soldiers who must 
determine whether an individual is a combatant or a civilian.  Since 
                                                            
6 Legitimate targets include members of regular armed forces, members of 
organized armed groups who perform a continuous combat function, and civilians 
directly participating in hostilities.  Illegitimate targets include civilians not 
directly participating in hostilities, religious and medical personnel, detainees and 
prisoners of war, as well as individuals who have surrendered or been rendered 
hors de combat by illness or injury.  See generally ICRC, INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Nils Melzer ed., 2009) [hereinafter DPH 
GUIDANCE].   
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civilians directly participating in hostilities are legitimate targets, in these 
passages readers should understand ‘combatant’ to include civilians 
directly participating in hostilities and should understand ‘civilian’ to 
exclude civilians directly participating in hostilities.7  This terminological 
clarification is important because in many contemporary conflicts the 
challenge is precisely to distinguish civilians directly participating in 
hostilities from civilians not directly participating in hostilities.  The 
principles defended and rules proposed in this article apply with particular 
urgency to such contemporary conflicts.   
In addition, for the purposes of this article, a soldier intentionally 
kills an individual only if it is the soldier’s purpose, goal, or conscious 
object to kill that individual.  Such intentional killings of targeted 
individuals are the primary subject of this article.  By contrast, a soldier 
who knowingly kills civilians as a side-effect of attacking a legitimate 
target is primarily beholden to the proportionality principle that I have 
discussed elsewhere.8   
 
I.  DISTINCTION AND PRECAUTION  
 The LOAC/IHL requires that soldiers distinguish between 
opposing combatants and civilians and take precautions in attack to avoid 
mistakenly killing civilians.  These requirements receive their clearest 
expression in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions but several 
are also recognized as rules of customary international law.  As we shall 
see, the indeterminacy of these requirements has led leading states, 
scholars, and practitioners to adopt a Balancing Approach to target 
verification, according to which both the required level of certainty and the 
required level of precaution varies with the balance of military and 
humanitarian considerations.   
 
A.  DISTINCTION 
First, “[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
                                                            
7 For example, the proposed rules would apply to a civilian intelligence operative 
covertly participating in armed conflict who must determine whether or not a 
civilian is directly participating in hostilities before attacking that civilian. 
8 See Adil Ahmad Haque, Proportionality (in War), in THE INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS (Hugh LaFollette et al. eds., 2012).    
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civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”9  The principle of distinction is 
a well-established part of customary international humanitarian law.10  The 
principle does not specify a level of certainty that soldiers must achieve or 
a level of risk they should accept to achieve that level of certainty.  The 
drafting history provides little insight, as discussion of this principle 
focused on the varying technological capacities of different armed forces to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants, rather than on the level of 
certainty with which this distinction must be made.11   
Protocol I also states that “[i]n the conduct of military operations, 
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and 
civilian objects.”12  The language of this provision, which suggests a legal 
duty of care owed by soldiers to civilians, might gesture toward a duty to 
accept some personal or operational risk to achieve an adequate level of 
certainty.  According to the ICRC, “[t]his provision appropriately 
supplements the basic rule of Article 48 . . . which urges Parties to the 
conflict to always distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants . . . .  It is quite clear that by respecting this [latter] obligation 
the Parties to the conflict will spare the civilian population . . . .”13  This 
comment is somewhat misleading and in any case unhelpful.  Even if a 
soldier succeeds in distinguishing between civilians and combatants, she is 
hardly guaranteed to spare the former:  among other things, the soldier 
must still select discriminating means and methods of warfare that can be 
directed at combatants and away from civilians.  Conversely, if the soldier 
exercises adequate care then she cannot be faulted if her attempts to 
distinguish civilians from combatants do not succeed.  But the comment 
tells us nothing about the level of care with which soldiers must attempt to 
distinguish civilians from combatants.  As A.P.V. Rogers concludes, “[t]he 
                                                            
9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter 
Protocol I] (emphasis added).   
10 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2005) (“Rule 1. The parties to the 
conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.”).   
11 See Protocol I Commentary, at 599-600.  
12 Protocol I, art. 57 (emphasis added).   
13 Protocol I Commentary, at 680.   
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law is not clear as to the degree of care required of the attacker or the 
degree of risk that he must be prepared to take.”14   
In the absence of clear textual guidance, several scholars have 
turned to the Balancing Approach to describe the required level of care.  In 
perhaps the most influential contemporary work on the ethics of armed 
conflict, Michael Walzer writes that “the degree of risk that is permissible 
[for soldiers to impose on civilians] is going to vary with the nature of the 
target, the urgency of the moment, the available technology, and so on” and 
concluded “that civilians have a right that ‘due care’ be taken” which 
reflects the balance of the relevant variables.15   
More recently, Matthew Waxman argues that soldiers should apply 
a flexible standard of ‘reasonable care’ according to which “reasonableness 
is judged in terms of costs to the attacker of performing more rigorous 
analysis or expending scarce military resources.”16  As Waxman concedes, 
“the reasonable care rule is disquieting.  It vests belligerents with 
considerable discretion in multifaceted balancing and legitimizes even 
large-scale injury to innocent civilians under certain circumstances.”17  
Specifically, if the standard of certainty is simply a function of the costs to 
an attacking force of mistakenly sparing an opposing combatant and the 
costs to a civilian of being mistakenly killed, then if the former even 
slightly outweigh the latter it would appear ‘reasonable’ for a soldier to 
attack an individual even if the soldier believes that individual is probably a 
civilian.  As we shall see in part II, this disquieting implication of the 
Balancing Approach is the product of two more fundamental defects.   
 
                                                            
14 A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 165, 177 
(2000).   
15 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 156 (1977).   
16 Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty 
and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1387 (2008).  
See also Dakota S. Rudesill, Precision War and Responsibility: Transformational 
Military Technology and the Duty of Care under the Laws of War, 32 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 517 (2007).   
17 Id. at 1393.   
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B.  DOUBT 
Second, Protocol I states that “[i]n case of doubt whether a person 
is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”18  Since 
civilians are not legitimate targets, this provision entails that ‘in case of 
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person’ may not be targeted.  
Although “[s]ome States have written this rule into their military manuals . 
. . . [o]thers have expressed reservations about the military ramifications of 
a strict interpretation of such a rule.”19  Indeed, if the provision is 
interpreted to mean that a soldier may never intentionally kill an individual 
if there is any reason to doubt that the individual is a combatant (that is, 
any reason to believe the individual is a civilian) then the provision would 
prove highly restrictive.  It is worth noting, however, that the Protocol does 
not identify the degree of ‘doubt’ that would preclude a lawful attack.  
Moreover, the ICRC has not endorsed the provision as a rule of customary 
international law.   
Tellingly, both France and the United Kingdom entered 
reservations to the Protocol I provision, with the United Kingdom stating 
that the provision “applies only in cases of substantial doubt” and with both 
countries stating that the provision cannot override “a commander's duty to 
protect the safety of troops under his command or to preserve his military 
situation.”20  In other words, both France and the United Kingdom maintain 
that it is lawful to attack an individual, despite substantial doubt that she is 
a combatant, if mistakenly sparing her (if she turns out to be a combatant) 
would jeopardize troop safety or mission success.  The degree of doubt 
sufficient to preclude attack would therefore seem to vary based on the 
balance of military and humanitarian considerations.     
                                                            
18 Protocol I, art. 50 (emphasis added).  See also Protocol I Commentary, at 611 
(“According to the ICRC draft there was ‘presumption’ of civilian status, but this 
concept led to some problems and the Working Group decided to replace 
‘presumed’ by ‘considered’.”)   
19 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 24 (citing the military manuals of 
Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Hungary, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia).  But see 
id. (citing the reservations of France and the United Kingdom).     
20 Reservation of the United Kingdom.  See also Reservation of France.  Rogers 
seems to accept a similar interpretation.  Cf. Rogers, at 181 (“In the event of doubt 
about the nature of the target, an attack should not be carried out, with a possible 
exception where failure to prosecute the attack would put attacking forces in 
immediate danger.”)   
  
2012] KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR 12 
In light of conflicting state practice, the ICRC found it “fair to 
conclude that when there is a situation of doubt, a careful assessment has to 
be made under the conditions and restraints governing a particular situation 
as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an attack.  One 
cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious.”21  The 
quoted passage indicates that, according to the ICRC, the principle of doubt 
means only that a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual whom she 
is reasonably certain is a civilian just because there is some reason to doubt 
that the individual is a civilian or, put the other way around, just because 
there is some reason to believe that the individual is a combatant.  This is, 
to put it mildly, a very low bar.  To accommodate states that fear a 
restrictive interpretation of the principle of doubt, the ICRC adopted one of 
the most permissive interpretations possible.  So interpreted, the principle 
seems to permit intentionally killing an individual who is most likely a 
civilian if there is a substantial possibility that she is a combatant (that is, 
more than a reasonable doubt that she is a civilian).  In the vast majority of 
cases, this interpretation will prove far too permissive.    
More recently, the ICRC has stated that the level of doubt that 
precludes attack is not fixed but rather varies with the possible 
consequences, for soldiers and civilians, of an erroneous decision:  
Obviously, the standard of doubt 
applicable to targeting decisions cannot be 
compared to the strict standard of doubt 
applicable in criminal proceedings but 
rather must reflect the level of certainty 
that can reasonably be achieved in the 
circumstances. In practice, this 
determination will have to take into 
account, inter alia, the intelligence 
available to the decision maker, the 
urgency of the situation, and the harm 
likely to result to the operating forces or to 
persons and objects protected against 
direct attack from an erroneous decision.22 
                                                            
21 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 24.  See also Protocol I Commentary, at 
612 (concluding that the principle of doubt “concerns persons who have not 
committed hostile acts, but whose status seems doubtful because of the 
circumstances. They should be considered to be civilians until further information 
is available, and should therefore not be attacked.”)   
22 DPH GUIDANCE, at 76. 
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Similarly, Ian Henderson writes that “[i]t cannot be expected that armed 
conflict will be reduced to the point where a commander can act only when 
he or she is 100 percent certain in all cases.  Rather, the level of certainty 
should vary based on the consequences for the civilian population.”23   
 Finally, a recent document reflecting the consensus of a group of 
distinguished experts states that “[t]he degree of doubt necessary to 
preclude an attack is that which would cause a reasonable attacker in the 
same or similar circumstances to abstain from ordering or executing an 
attack.”24  Notice that, in this formulation, the degree of doubt that would 
lead a reasonable attacker to abstain from attacking must vary based on the 
circumstances; otherwise, the reference to such circumstances would be 
superfluous.  It follows that, in some circumstances, a reasonable attacker 
might attack even in the face of substantial doubt; in other circumstances, a 
reasonable attacker might abstain from attack in the face of even slight 
doubt.  The group of experts does not adopt a fixed standard of certainty 
but rather adopts a variable standard.  Unfortunately, the group of experts 
does not identify the relevant variables.  However, it would be difficult to 
argue that a reasonable attacker would never consider the costs of an 
erroneous decision in deciding whether or not to attack despite some degree 
of doubt.  So it would seem that the degree of doubt sufficient to preclude 
attack varies with the relative costs of error.   
 
C.  VERIFICATION 
Third, Protocol I states that “those who plan or decide upon an 
attack shall . . . do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be 
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to 
special protection but are military objectives . . . .”25  This provision is also 
                                                            
23 IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY 
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, at 164 (2009).   
24 COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 87 (2010) (hereinafter HPCR 
MANUAL COMMENTARY).  See also Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in 
International Humanitarian Law, ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 17, 56-57 (20__) 
(“In all cases of doubt, the appropriate international humanitarian law standard on 
the battlefield is whether a reasonable warfighter in [the] same or similar 
circumstances would hesitate to act based on the degree of doubt he harbored.”)  
Schmitt was one of the experts who contributed to the HPCR Manual.   
25 Protocol I, art. 57(2)(a) (emphasis added).    
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recognized as a statement of customary international law.26  This provision 
raises at least two sets of questions.  First, what level of certainty is 
required to ‘verify’ the legitimacy of a target?  Is the legitimacy of a target 
verified if it is probably military rather than civilian, much more likely 
military than civilian, or almost certainly military and not civilian?  
Second, how much risk, if any, must soldiers accept to themselves or to the 
success of their mission in order to ‘do everything feasible’ to verify the 
legitimacy of their target?  If the information soldiers already have or could 
safely acquire is insufficient to warrant the level of certainty required for 
‘verification’ must they seek additional information at additional risk?   
In its original commentary on Protocol I, the ICRC stated that “in 
case of doubt, even if there is only slight doubt, [those who plan or decide 
upon an attack] must call for additional information and if need be give 
orders for further reconnaissance.”27  This comment suggests that the level 
of certainty required to verify the legitimacy of a target is extremely high, 
so high as to exclude even “slight doubt.”  Moreover, the comment 
suggests that soldiers must engage in reconnaissance, accepting risks to 
themselves, to gather enough information to satisfy the required level of 
certainty.  However, as we saw above, the ICRC no longer maintains that 
the LOAC/IHL requires such a high level of certainty but instead 
recognizes a variable level of certainty in keeping with the Balancing 
Approach.28  
Although Protocol I does not define the phrase ‘everything 
feasible’, Protocols II and III to the Conventional Weapons Convention 
(CWC) state that “[f]easible precautions are those precautions which are 
practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances 
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”29  
                                                            
26 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 55 (“Rule 16. Each party to the conflict 
must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.”) 
27 Protocol I Commentary, at 680.  See also id. at 681 (“The evaluation of the 
information obtained must include a serious check of its accuracy.”) 
28 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.   
29 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices (Protocol II) art. 3(4), as amended May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133; 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol III) art. 1(5), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171.  See also Lt. Col. 
William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional 
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 108 (1982) (concluding, based on the statements of 
the United States, Germany and Italy during the drafting process, that “‘feasible’ in 
Article 57(2)(a) means ‘practicable or practically possible’”).   
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The ICRC has stated that the definition of ‘feasible precautions’ under the 
CWC Protocols provides the definition of ‘everything feasible’ under 
Protocol I.30  Unfortunately, the CWC Protocols define the vague notion of 
what is ‘feasible’ in terms of the equally vague notion of what is 
‘practicable or practically possible’ and a sweeping reference to all 
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations.  In light of this indeterminacy, the ICRC now limits itself to 
stating that “[t]his determination [of feasibility] must be made in good faith 
and in view of all information that can be said to be reasonably available in 
the specific situation.”31  No required level of certainty is proposed, and 
soldiers are not called upon to risk themselves or their mission to obtain 
additional information.32 
In the absence of clear textual guidance, leading scholars have 
turned to the Balancing Approach to describe the precautions that soldiers 
must take to verify that their targets are military and not civilian.  For 
example, Michael Schmitt argues that the “feasibility [of a precaution] 
must be interpreted by balancing humanitarian and military considerations. 
. . . By this analysis, the greater the anticipated collateral damage or 
incidental injury, the greater the risk [soldiers] can reasonably be asked to 
shoulder.”33  Relatedly, a group of distinguished experts of which Schmitt 
is a member concludes that the feasibility of precautions often depends on 
                                                            
30 DPH GUIDANCE, at 75.   
31 DPH Study, at 75.  See also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 126 (2004) (characterizing the 
principle of verification as “an obligation of due diligence and acting in good 
faith.”)     
32 Similarly, the Advisory Committee to the Office of the Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concludes that  
“[t]he obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military 
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and 
evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also direct 
his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets during 
operations.”  See Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by 
the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para. 29 (June 13, 2000), available at http:// 
www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf.  The Report does not address either the 
level of certainty required ‘to properly identify targets during operations’ or what 
risks, if any, soldiers are obliged to undertake in order to reach that level of 
certainty.   
33 Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 462 (2005).   
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considerations of force protection, suggesting that the required precautions 
vary based on the weight of military considerations.34  Similarly, Geoffrey 
Corn argues that the feasibility inquiry permits attackers to balance the risk 
to their own forces against the risk of mistakenly attacking civilians.35   
Finally, Matthew Waxman concludes that “[t]he responsibility to ‘do 
everything feasible’ [to verify the legitimacy of potential targets] . . . is 
generally interpreted to be not a fixed and always highly exacting duty—
like, say, the beyond reasonable doubt approach of criminal law—but a 
balancing one: Parties are obliged to balance humanitarian concerns for 
civilians with military needs.”36  
 Before moving on, it is worth noting that many states have 
incorporated the principle of verification into their military manuals.  Few 
states have identified the level of certainty, either fixed or variable, that 
qualifies as ‘verification’.37  With respect to the level of risk soldiers must 
accept in order to achieve verification, most states simply follow Protocol I 
in requiring their forces to do everything feasible to achieve target 
verification38; some cast the requirement in terms of what is ‘reasonable’ or 
‘practical’39; and some prefer different, but equally open-textured 
                                                            
34 HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY, at 136.   
35 See Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Principle 3: Endeavor to Prevent or Minimize 
Harm to Civilians, 1998 ARMY LAW 55, 55-56 (“Feasibility provides a limited 
mechanism to bypass applying certain rules related to minimizing civilian harm 
when application would be harmful to the force.”).   
36 Waxman, supra note 16, at 1388 (2008).   
37  A possible exception is Belgium, which instructs its forces that an object can be 
attacked only when it reasonably can be considered a military objective.  See 
Belgium’s Teaching Manual for Soldiers.   
38 See, e.g., Australia; Canada; Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997); New Zealand’s 
Military Manual (1992); UK LOAC Manual (2004); US Air Force Pamphlet 
(1976).   
39 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE Appendix A-v (1956) (stating that “[t]hose who plan or decide upon an 
attack, therefore, must take all reasonable steps to ensure . . . that the objectives are 
identified as military objectives of defended places”); US Naval Handbook (1995) 
(“All reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure that only military objectives 
are targeted.”); Argentina’s Manual (“Those who plan or decide upon an attack 
shall, as far as possible, verify that the objectives to be attacked are not civilians, 
nor civilian objects, nor subject to special protection.”); Cameroon’s Instructors’ 
Manual (1992) (requiring that “those who plan or decide upon an attack do 
everything that is practically possible to verify that the targets to be attacked are 
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formulations.40  Only two small states explicitly require that “[a]ll 
necessary measures must be taken to verify that the target to be destroyed is 
a military objective.”41  However, a number of states impose an unqualified 
duty to verify the status of targets, which seems to imply that their forces 
must take all necessary risks to achieve the (unspecified) required level of 
certainty.42  In addition, three states explicitly require reconnaissance, 
which generally places troops in harm’s way.43  As these different 
instructions make clear, there is no consensus among states regarding either 
the level of certainty required for verification or the level of risk soldiers 
must accept to achieve verification.     
 
                                                                                                                                         
military objectives”); Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) (“All reasonable precautions 
must be taken to ensure that only military objectives are targeted.”).    
40 See, e.g., Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) (“In any attack it is 
imperative to verify that the attack will be directed against a specific military 
target.”)   
41 Benin’s Military Manual (1995); Togo’s Military Manual (1996).  In addition, 
Denmark instructs its forces that “[c]ombatants must do everything in their power 
to verify that the objects to be attacked are not protected under IHL.”  See 
Denmark Military Manual.   
42 See, e.g., France’s LOAC Manual (2001) (providing that those who plan or 
decide upon an attack must “verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects”), Germany’s Military Manual (1992) (“Before 
engaging an objective, every responsible military leader shall verify the military 
nature of the objective to be attacked.”), Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) 
(imposing a duty to “verify the military character of objectives and targets”), The 
Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands (“During the selection of targets and 
the preparation of attacks, it must be verified that the objectives to be attacked are 
neither civilians nor civilian objects but are military objectives.”); Sweden’s IHL 
Manual (1991) (“The responsible commander shall verify that the attack is really 
directed against a military objective and not against [a] civilian population or 
civilian objects.”) 
43 See Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) (“The military character of the objective shall 
be verified by reconnaissance and target identification.”); Italy’s LOAC 
Elementary Rules Manual (1991) (“The military character of the objective shall be 
verified by reconnaissance and target identification.”); Madagascar’s Military 
Manual (1994) (“The military character of an objective or target must be verified 
by reconnaissance and target identification.”)   
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D.  APPARENT PROTECTION 
Finally, Protocol I states that “an attack shall be cancelled or 
suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or 
is subject to special protection.”44  This provision is also recognized as a 
rule of customary international humanitarian law.45  The ICRC remarks that 
“[t]he text is sufficiently clear for lengthy comment to be superfluous”46 
but there are at least two textual ambiguities that must be resolved.  First, is 
it ‘apparent’ that an objective is civilian and not military if, given available 
information, it is probably (that is, more likely) civilian rather than military, 
much more likely civilian than military, or almost certainly civilian and not 
military?  Second, does the provision apply only when the protected status 
of an objective is subjectively apparent to the actual attacker or does it also 
apply when the protected status of an object would be objectively apparent 
to a reasonable attacker faced with the same information?   
The ICRC comments, by way of illustration, that “an airman who 
has received the order to machine-gun troops travelling along a road, and 
who finds only children going to school, must abstain from attack.”47  This 
example suggests that an attack must be cancelled or suspended only if, as 
a result of new information, the actual attacker comes to subjectively 
believe that a person or object is almost certainly civilian rather than 
military.48  At best, the ICRC Commentary leaves the textual ambiguities 
unresolved; at worst, the Commentary gives the provision an extremely 
narrow construction.  In either case, the narrow and indeterminate scope of 
the provision offers little guidance in situations of significant uncertainty.  
To provide greater guidance to soldiers and greater protection to civilians 
                                                            
44 Protocol I, art. 57(2)(b) (emphasis added).   
45 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 60 (“Rule 19. Each party to the conflict 
must do everything feasible to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent 
that the target is not a military objective . . . .”) 
46 Protocol I Commentary, at 686.   
47 Protocol I Commentary, at 686.   
48 See also id. at 686 (“It is principally by visual means—in particular, by means of 
aerial observation—that an attacker will find out that an intended objective is not a 
military objective, or that it is an object entitled to special protection.”).  Here too, 
the phrases “finds out”, “is not”, and “is” imply that an attack must be cancelled or 
suspended only if the attacker is almost certain that an object is not military or is 
otherwise protected.  See also HPRC MANUAL COMMENTARY, at 130 (stating that 
an attacker must cancel or suspend an attack “when it becomes apparent to them” 
that an object is not a lawful target) (emphasis added).   
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we must integrate the law with a moral theory of killing in the fog of war.  
It is to the search for such a theory that we now turn.   
 
II.  THE BALANCING APPROACH AND ITS LIMITS 
As we have seen, in the absence of clear legal rules, the ICRC as 
well as leading states and scholars have adopted the Balancing Approach to 
target verification.  According to the Balancing Approach, the level of 
certainty required to permissibly attack an individual varies with the 
balance of relevant military and humanitarian considerations. Until now, 
proponents of the Balancing Approach have not explained how to weigh 
military considerations against humanitarian considerations or how to 
derive the required level of certainty from the resulting balance.  As one 
scholar observes, “[h]umanitarian considerations would require a pilot to 
get close to the target to identify it properly; military considerations would 
require the pilot to fly at a safe height to be at reduced risk from anti-
aircraft fire.  This is a conflict that cannot be resolved easily.”49  However, 
this part argues that decision theory provides a method for deriving the 
required level of certainty from the relative costs of error.   
 Unfortunately, by clarifying the Balancing Approach we also 
expose its serious flaws.  The Balancing Approach implausibly entails that 
soldiers may attack individuals whom they believe are probably civilians if 
the potential harm to soldiers even slightly outweighs the potential harm to 
civilians.  The implausibility of this result is best explained by two moral 
asymmetries.  The asymmetry between killing and letting die explains why 
it is substantially worse to kill a civilian than to allow a soldier to be killed, 
even though the loss of human life in each case is the same.  The 
asymmetry between intentionally and unintentionally killing the innocent 
explains why it is far worse to intentionally kill an individual correctly 
believing her to be a civilian than to intentionally kill an individual 
mistakenly believing her to be a combatant, even though both the loss of 
human life and the causal structure of the action is the same.  These two 
moral asymmetries doom the Balancing Approach and ground the 
alternative, deontological approach to targeting developed in Part III.   
 
A. UNCERTAINTY 
Proponents of the Balancing Approach have never explained how 
to derive a required level of certainty from the balance of military and 
                                                            
49 Rogers, at 175.   
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humanitarian considerations.  This neglect leaves the Balancing Approach 
imprecise and conceals its flaws.  Fortunately, the entire field of decision 
theory is devoted to determining how to make rational decisions in the 
context of factual uncertainty.  On most views, our primary goal when 
faced with uncertainty should be error reduction.  For example, in a 
criminal trial, our primary purpose is to learn the truth about past events so 
we may convict the guilty and acquit the innocent.  We seek to avoid both 
false convictions and false acquittals.  Similarly, the primary goal of a 
soldier, in the context of our discussion, is to accurately distinguish 
between civilians and combatants so she may spare the former and kill or 
capture the latter.  Soldiers should seek to reduce both the number of 
civilians they mistakenly harm and the number of opposing combatants 
they mistakenly spare.  It follows that, before attacking an individual, 
soldiers should gather as much relevant information about that individual 
as they can without risking themselves or their mission.  Soldiers should 
then evaluate the information they gather based on its cumulative probative 
weight discounted by any possible prejudicial impact. 
Unfortunately, we can reduce but never completely avoid 
erroneous decisions.  Some residual uncertainty will always remain despite 
our best efforts, and as a result we will inevitably make mistakes.  Hence 
our secondary, fallback goal when faced with uncertainty should be error 
distribution.  Given that we will make errors, we must determine which 
errors are more costly and which we should therefore try harder to avoid.  
Our judgment regarding the relative costs of error are reflected in a 
standard of certainty which, if consistently followed, will yield over time 
the lowest total cost of error.  For example, in criminal law, our judgment 
that convicting an innocent defendant (a false positive or Type I error) is 
much worse than acquitting a guilty defendant (a false negative or Type II 
error) is reflected in the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which yields over time far fewer false convictions than false acquittals.  
Similarly, the level of certainty a soldier must achieve before killing an 
individual should reflect a moral judgment regarding the relative moral 
weight of killing a civilian and allowing oneself, one’s fellow soldiers, or 
other civilians to be killed.   
In principle, one can calculate the level of certainty required to 
make a rational decision based on the relative costs of false positives and 
false negatives.50  Specifically, the probability P of a claim C given the 
                                                            
50 See, e.g., ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 15-16 (2005).  See also 
id. at 149 (using a different formula to fix the required level of certainty, according 
to which the odds that a claim is true, given the evidence, must be greater than the 
ratio of the costs of a false positive to the costs of a false positive:  O(C|E) > 
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evidence E must be greater than the following function of the costs of a 
false positive (D+) and a false negative (D-):   
P(C|E) > 1/(1 + (!!)
(!!)
) 
Given plausible assumptions, this function can yield plausible results.  For 
example, if convicting an innocent defendant of a crime generally is ten 
times worse than acquitting a guilty defendant of a crime, then the level of 
certainty required for criminal conviction will be very high:   
P(C|E) > 1/(1 + !
!"
)   = 1/1.1   =    .91 
Presumably, greater-than-91% certainty is a fair approximation of the 
criminal law standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  By contrast, if a 
false judgment for a tort plaintiff is neither better nor worse than a false 
judgment for a tort defendant then the level of certainty required to find for 
the plaintiff will be just barely higher than the level of certainty required to 
find for the defendant:   
P(C|E) > 1/(1 + !
!
) = 1/2 = .50              
Presumably, greater-than-50% certainty is a fair approximation of the 
private law standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.   
Before using this formula to clarify the Balancing Approach, it is 
worth pausing to consider the formula’s moral foundations.  One account, 
offered by many decision theorists, is that decision-makers should adopt 
decision rules that will minimize the total cost of the errors they will make 
over the long term.  The total cost of error, in turn, depends on the relative 
costs of the different errors one might make.  In order to minimize the total 
cost of error, decision-makers should adopt a decision rule that will lead 
them to make more less-costly errors and fewer more-costly errors.  The 
standard of certainty is a mechanism for skewing decisions in favor of less-
                                                                                                                                         
(D(+)/D(-)).  Larry Laudan and Harry Saunders have impressively argued that, on 
a conceptual level, the standard of certainty should also reflect the value of true 
positives and true negatives.  See, e.g., Larry Laudan & Harry Saunders, Re-
Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of 
Trial Outcomes, XX _____ XX (20XX).  However, in the context of armed 
conflict, true negatives do not appear to have significant benefits other than 
avoiding the costs of false positives, and true positives do not appear to have 
significant benefits other than avoiding the costs of false negatives.  Consideration 
of true positives and true negatives should not affect the required standard of 
certainty.  I will therefore use the more conventional and widely-accepted formula 
for calculating the required standard of certainty.   
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costly errors.  In other words, since we can reduce but never eliminate the 
risk of error, we should distribute any residual risk of error so as to 
minimize the total cost of error.   
All of this may sound uncomfortably consequentialist, but it need 
not.  We could just as easily say that our primary goal is to avoid 
committing serious moral wrongs; that, given factual uncertainty, we will 
unavoidably fail and end up committing some such wrongs; that the best 
we can do is try to reduce the overall seriousness of the wrongs we commit; 
and that we must therefore act in the face of uncertainty in a way that 
reflects the relative seriousness of different wrongs.  For example, it is 
wrong to convict the innocent and wrong to acquit the guilty.  
Unfortunately, we can reduce but not eliminate the risk of mistakenly 
committing one wrong or the other.  Since the former is a much more 
serious wrong than the latter, we should convict only with a level of 
certainty that will lead us to inadvertently commit the more serious wrong 
(false conviction) much less often than the less serious wrong (false 
acquittal).  We will thereby reduce the overall seriousness of the wrongs we 
inadvertently commit.   
 
B.  THE BALANCING APPROACH REVISITED 
We now can see how decision theory can enhance the determinacy 
of the Balancing Approach.  In the context of target verification, soldiers 
may err in two ways:  by mistakenly identifying a civilian as a combatant 
and then killing her (a false positive), or by mistakenly identifying a 
combatant as a civilian and then sparing her (a false negative).  False 
positives carry obvious costs to civilians while false negatives carry 
significant costs to the attacking force.  According to decision theory, the 
level of certainty a soldier must posses that an individual is a combatant 
and not a civilian before using deadly force can be represented as a 
function of the relative costs of a false positive and a false negative.  
Importantly, the relative costs of error to civilians and to the attacking force 
will vary from case to case, so the required level of certainty will vary as 
well.  In other words, the required level of certainty varies with the balance 
of military and humanitarian considerations, just as the Balancing 
Approach proposes.   
To simplify the following discussion, let us assume that the cost of 
a false positive is that you will kill a civilian and the cost of a false negative 
is that you will spare a combatant who may go on to kill one or more of 
your fellow soldiers.  This is no more than a simplifying assumption, 
subject to three important qualifications.  
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First, the costs of both killing civilians and (particularly) sparing 
combatants vary from case to case.  On one hand, while every false positive 
involves the death of a civilian, not every false negative results in the death 
of a fellow soldier.  Not every opposing combatant makes a necessary 
contribution to lethal operations such that killing her will prevent even one 
fellow soldier from being killed, and mistakenly spared combatants will 
often be killed in future engagements before they can kill even one fellow 
soldier.51  In addition, according to contemporary counterinsurgency 
theory, killing an insurgent may have little strategic benefits since her death 
may inspire others to take up arms, while killing a civilian may have 
strategic costs by turning the civilian population against one’s forces.52  On 
the other hand, the death of a combatant not only eliminates the threat she 
poses but also may (perhaps temporarily) deplete the opposing force.  In 
some cases, a combatant who is mistakenly spared at one time may become 
more dangerous or more difficult to kill or capture later.  In addition, the 
deaths of soldiers at the hands of mistakenly spared combatants may place 
other soldiers at greater risk or jeopardize the success of a mission or, over 
time, the success of the war effort.  It seems to me that these variables 
offset one another to a sufficient degree that it is unlikely that their net 
weight would significantly change the conclusions of this part.   
Second, often a soldier who kills a suspected combatant will also 
unintentionally but knowingly kill one or more civilians as a side-effect of 
her attack.  In such cases, the soldier must not only reach the required level 
of certainty that the targeted individual is a combatant but also ensure that 
the expected military advantage of killing that individual (that is, the value 
of killing her if she is a combatant, discounted by the likelihood that she is 
a combatant) substantially outweighs the unintended loss of civilian life.53   
Finally, the costs of error will themselves be uncertain, so strictly 
speaking we should compare the average expected costs of error, that is, 
the average of the possible costs of an erroneous decision discounted by 
their respective probabilities.  Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity we 
will assume that the average expected costs of error are that either a soldier 
will kill a civilian or that a spared combatant may kill one or more soldiers.  
                                                            
51 In criminal law, we can sometimes correct false convictions but can never 
correct false acquittals.  In armed conflict, the opposite is the case; there are no 
appeals, but there is double jeopardy.   
52 See, e.g., DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE U.S. ARMY AND MARINE 
CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24, 
2006).   
53 See Haque, Proportionality (in War).   
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We should start from the assumption that the death of a civilian 
and the death of a soldier are equally bad outcomes.  Civilians and soldiers 
are, after all, human beings.  Accordingly, it would seem that even if the 
cost of a false negative is the death of only one soldier the required level of 
certainty would be fairly low:   
P(C|E) > 1/(1 + !
!
)  = 1/2 = .50              
In other words, it seems that on the Balancing Approach it is permissible to 
kill an individual whom you believe is only slightly more likely a 
combatant than a civilian in order to prevent one soldier from being killed 
if the individual turns out to be a combatant.  Moreover, it seems that if the 
cost of a false negative is the death of two fellow soldiers then the required 
level of certainty is even lower:   
P(C|E) > 1/(1 + !
!
) = 1/3 = .33              
In other words, according to the Balancing Approach, it is permissible for a 
soldier to intentionally kill an individual whom the soldier is reasonably 
certain is a civilian (indeed, whom the soldier reasonably estimates is twice 
as likely a civilian than a combatant) in order to prevent two soldiers from 
being killed if the individual turns out to be a combatant.  Put another way, 
a soldier may take a 66% chance of killing a civilian to avoid a 33% chance 
of allowing two soldiers to be killed.  These results seem implausible.  
Why?   
 
C.  LIMITS: KILLING AND LETTING DIE 
The fact that soldiers and civilians are human beings whose lives 
are equal in value does not entail that their deaths should count equally in 
determining the relative costs of error.  We must also consider how their 
deaths come about—how their deaths are causally related to our conduct.54  
Specifically, there is a moral asymmetry between killing a human being 
and letting a human being die.55  This moral asymmetry manifests itself is 
                                                            
54 The idea that the permissibility of our actions depends not only on their 
consequences but also on their causal structure is an essential part of any 
nonconsequentialist moral theory.  See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Towards the Essence of 
Nonconsequentialist Constraints, in FACT AND VALUE (A. Byrne, et al. eds., 2001).   
55 As Jeff McMahan observes, “[v]irtually all of us, even consequentialists, act on 
the presupposition that the constraint against harmful killing is in general stronger 
than the constraint against harmfully allowing someone to die, when all other 
relevant factors, such as intention, are the same in both cases.”  Jeff McMahan, The 
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several important ways.  Most importantly, it is not morally permissible to 
kill one innocent person either as means or as a side-effect of preventing 
another innocent person from being killed.56  It is not permissible to 
intentionally kill one person as a means of preventing several others from 
being killed (say, by using the healthy organs of one person to replace the 
damaged organs of several others).  Nor is it permissible to unintentionally 
kill one person as a side-effect of preventing one other person from being 
killed (say, by throwing a grenade at an attacker surrounded by innocent 
bystanders).  Forced to choose between killing one innocent person and 
allowing another innocent person to die we must choose the latter.   
In contrast, absent special obligations, generally it is permissible to 
allow an innocent person to die as a means or as a side-effect of preventing 
several others from being killed.  For example, generally it is permissible to 
use limited medication to save several people even if, as a side-effect, one 
other person will die without that medication.  In addition, if removing one 
person from danger will expose several others to the same danger then 
generally it is permissible to allow the one person to die as a means of 
protecting the several.  Finally, generally it is impermissible to kill an 
innocent person to avoid serious harm to yourself, but generally it is 
permissible to allow an innocent person to die if rescuing her from danger 
would involve serious harm to yourself.  Each of the asymmetric outcomes 
described above are rooted in the general moral asymmetry between killing 
and letting die.  We can refer to this asymmetry by saying that killing is 
morally worse, or harder to justify, than letting die.57   
If killing generally is worse than letting die, then, even if the lives 
of civilians and the lives of soldiers have equal moral value, generally it is 
                                                                                                                                         
Just Distribution of Harm Between Combatants and Noncombatants, 38 
PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 342, 369 (2010).  
56 See also id. (“This moral asymmetry between killing and letting die provides, 
among other things, part of the explanation of why it is impermissible to kill an 
innocent bystander as a means of preserving one’s own life, and perhaps the full 
explanation of why it is impermissible to kill an innocent bystander as a side effect 
of defending or preserving one’s own life.”)  
57 Significantly, in some cases unjustifiable killing and unjustifiable letting die may 
be equally morally blameworthy.  See, e.g., James Rachels, Active and Passive 
Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975) (comparing the drowning of a child 
to inherit a large fortune with allowing a child to drown for the same reason).  
However, the preceding discussion shows that killing is harder to justify than 
letting die, and is worse in that sense.   
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worse to kill a civilian than to allow a soldier to be killed.58  If you are 
deciding whether to kill an individual who might be a civilian or possibly 
allow a fellow soldier to be killed, then generally you should err in favor of 
the latter, generally lesser wrong.  More precisely, if killing a civilian is 
substantially worse than allowing a soldier to be killed, you may not kill an 
individual unless she is at least equally substantially more likely (or 
proportionately more likely) a combatant than a civilian.  For example, if 
killing a civilian is twice as bad as allowing a soldier to be killed, then you 
may not kill an individual unless she is at least twice as likely a combatant 
rather than a civilian (67% versus 33%); if three times as bad then three 
times as likely (75% versus 25%); and so on.   
One might think that the moral asymmetry between killing and 
letting die is offset by the moral obligations of soldiers to protect one 
another.  Such associative obligations may be very strong.  Many soldiers 
feel obligated to risk their own lives to defend their fellow soldiers from 
attack, to carry those who are wounded, and to rescue those who are 
captured.  However, there are at least three reasons why such associative 
obligations do not substantially offset the moral asymmetry between killing 
civilians and allowing soldiers to be killed.   
First, generally it is not permissible to shift risks from one person 
onto another person who has not voluntarily assumed those risks; in such 
cases, the risks must lie where they fall.59  If those at risk have voluntarily 
assumed those risks then it is even harder to justify shifting those risks onto 
others who have not voluntarily assumed those risks.  Since soldiers 
generally assume the risks of combat voluntarily while civilians generally 
do not, it is even harder for soldiers to justify shifting risks from 
themselves onto civilians.  Of course, many soldiers are conscripted or join 
                                                            
58 Does the asymmetry between killing and letting die also entail that it is worse to 
kill an opposing combatant than to allow a soldier to be killed, since combatants 
are also human beings whose lives have equal moral vale?  No.  It is generally 
permissible to kill a lethal attacker in self-defense or defense of others.  Soldiers 
fighting for a just cause have a moral right to kill opposing combatants to defend 
themselves and their fellow soldiers from lethal attack.  For further discussion see 
Adil Ahmad Haque, Criminal Law and Morality at War, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 481 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).  
59 See Haque, Proportionality (in War).  In some cases, it may be permissible to 
redirect a pre-existing threat from several people to one person.  See, e.g., Judith 
Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale L.J. 94 1395 (1985).  But 
generally it is impermissible to redirect a pre-existing threat from one person to 
one other person.  Certainly, generally it is not permissible to create a new risk of 
harm to one person in order to avert a pre-existing risk of harm to another person.   
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the military to escape poverty.  However, generally it is not permissible to 
kill innocent people to avoid punishment or escape poverty.  
Second, the notion that associative obligations can help justify 
killing civilians is itself highly dubious.  As McMahan observes, “a third 
party acting to defend another person may in general cause no more harm 
to innocent bystanders than the person he is defending would be permitted 
to cause by acting in self-defense.  And most people agree that it is not 
permissible for a person to defend her own life if in doing so she would 
unavoidably kill an innocent bystander as a side effect.”60  Similarly, 
Walzer observes that an officer “cannot save [the soldiers under her 
command], because they cannot save themselves, by killing innocent 
people.”61  
Finally, it is both morally and legally impermissible to indirectly 
cause the death of a civilian either as a means of saving oneself or another 
soldier (for example, by using a civilian as a human shield) or as a side-
effect of saving oneself or another soldier (for example, by hiding among 
civilians).  It could hardly be permissible to directly cause the death of a 
civilian in order to save oneself or another soldier.   
The preceding discussion also explains why it remains worse for a 
soldier to kill a civilian than to allow another civilian to be killed, even if 
the soldier has a stronger moral obligation to protect some civilians than to 
protect other civilians.62  If generally it is impermissible to shift risks from 
                                                            
60 McMahan, at 376-77.  Again, it would not be permissible to throw a grenade at a 
lethal attacker surrounded by innocent bystanders.   
61 Walzer, at 155.   
62 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin argue that soldiers have a stronger duty to 
minimize harm to fellow citizens than to minimize harm to foreign civilians and 
conclude that soldiers are morally permitted to minimize harm to fellow citizens by 
killing foreign civilians.  See Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, Military Ethics of 
Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective, 4 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 3, 14-15, 
18-21 (2005).  I will not discuss their argument at length because the intermediate 
premises of their argument are highly implausible.  For example, they assert that 
“[i]t is as morally wrong for the state to let its citizens die [when killing foreign 
civilians would prevent their deaths] as it is morally wrong to kill them.”  Id. at 20.  
However, it seems clear that it is much worse for a state to kill its citizens than to 
allow its citizens to be killed, holding the state’s reasons (say, to avoid killing 
foreign civilians) constant.  Certainly it is much worse for a state to kill its citizens 
for no reason than to allow its citizens to be killed to avoid killing foreign civilians.  
I will therefore only discuss the less implausible claim that a soldier’s duty to 
protect certain civilians offsets the moral asymmetry between killing foreign 
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one group of innocent people to another, then it is impermissible to shift 
risks from from one group of civilians to another.  Moreover, a soldier has 
no right to inflict greater harm to protect any civilians than those civilians 
have a right to inflict to protect themselves.  Since it is impermissible for 
one civilian to kill another civilian as a means or as a side-effect of saving 
her own life, it is also impermissible for a soldier to kill one civilian as a 
means or as a side-effect of saving another civilian.63  Finally, since it is 
impermissible to protect any civilians by indirectly causing the death of 
other civilians (by using the other civilians as human shields or by hiding 
among them) it cannot be permissible to protect any civilians by directly 
causing the death of other civilians.  It follows that whether mistakenly 
sparing a combatant will result in the death of soldiers or the death of 
civilians the required level of certainty must always reflect the moral 
asymmetry between killing and letting die.   
 
D.  LIMITS: INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL KILLING 
Would a Modified Balancing Approach, that incorporates the 
distinction between killing and letting die, provide a moral basis for 
targeting in armed conflict?  For the sake of convenience, let us assume 
that mistakenly killing a civilian is twice as bad as mistakenly allowing a 
soldier to die.  If a mistakenly spared combatant would kill one soldier, 
then soldiers must be moderately certain that an individual is a combatant 
before attacking her:   
P(C|E) > 1/(1 + !
!
) = 1/1.5 = .67              
To some, 67% certainty that an individual is a combatant may sound like a 
reasonable level of certainty to require of soldiers.   
However, even on the Modified Balancing Approach, the more 
soldiers you might save by killing a combatant the less sure you have to be 
that an individual is a combatant rather than a civilian in the first place.  
For example, if a mistakenly spared combatant would kill 20 soldiers, then 
soldiers may attack an individual who is almost certainly a civilian and not 
a combatant:   
P(C|E) > 1/(1 + !"
!
)  = 1/11 = .09              
                                                                                                                                         
civilians and allowing fellow citizens to be killed.  For a more comprehensive 
refutation of Kasher and Yadlin’s arguments see McMahan at 346-50.   
63 See Haque, Proportionality (in War).   
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So, according to even a Modified Balancing Approach, it is permissible to 
kill an individual whom one is 90% sure is a civilian if there is a 10% 
chance that she is a combatant and that by killing her you will save 20 
soldiers.  Yet this result seems completely implausible.  Why?   
If you are almost certain that someone is a civilian then you 
presumably believe that she is a civilian; and if you intentionally kill an 
individual who is in fact a civilian, believing her to be a civilian, then you 
intentionally kill a civilian.  Needless to say, intentionally killing a civilian 
is the most serious violation of LOAC/IHL, just as intentionally killing a 
human being who has done nothing to deserve or make herself liable to be 
killed is the most serious of moral wrongs.  This wrong is never justifiable, 
except perhaps in the most extreme circumstances to prevent far greater 
harm to others.64  Certainly, it is not morally justifiable to intentionally kill 
a civilian for a 10% chance of saving 20 soldiers.65   
Now, we earlier assumed, based on the moral asymmetry between 
killing and letting die, that mistakenly killing a civilian is twice as bad as 
mistakenly sparing a combatant and thereby allowing a fellow soldier to be 
killed.  But we have now introduced a second, stronger moral asymmetry, 
between intentionally killing civilians and unintentionally killing civilians.  
In other words, we earlier assumed that mistakenly killing a civilian is 
equivalent to unintentionally killing a civilian.  But this need not be the 
case.  If you intentionally kill someone whom you reasonably but 
mistakenly believe is a combatant, then you have unintentionally killed a 
civilian.  And unintentionally killing a civilian is substantially worse, but 
not far worse, than allowing a soldier to be killed.  By contrast, if you 
intentionally kill someone whom you believe is a civilian, then you have 
intentionally killed a civilian.  And intentionally killing a civilian is far 
worse than allowing a soldier to be killed.   
We can put the point a different way:  We have been following the 
assumption of the Balancing Approach that the required level of certainty is 
a function of the relative costs of error.  But we now see that the relative 
                                                            
64 Walzer famously holds that attacks on civilian populations could only be 
justifiable to prevent a “supreme emergency” involving the destruction of an entire 
political community.  See WALZER, ch. 16.  Presumably, it follows that attacks on 
individual civilians are justifiable only to prevent far greater harm to others.     
65 Indeed, it is probably impermissible to intentionally kill a civilian to certainly 
save 20 soldiers.  See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 249, 253 (1996) (observing that “if the norms of morality prohibit the 
action of killing an innocent person, one may not kill an innocent person even if 
doing so would prevent twenty innocent people from being killed.”)    
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moral costs of error are themselves a function of an actor’s subjective level 
of certainty.  A soldier’s subjective level of certainty that an individual is a 
combatant or a civilian affects whether or not, in the event of a false 
positive, she intentionally kills a civilian or unintentionally kills a civilian.  
As we have seen, the moral cost of a false positive will be far greater if the 
soldier intentionally kills a civilian than if she unintentionally kills a 
civilian.  Crucially, this difference in the moral cost of a false positive will, 
in turn, affect the level of certainty required to permissibly open fire.  The 
asymmetry between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians, as 
well as the effect of this asymmetry on the required level of certainty, will 
be discussed in greater depth in the following part.   
 
III.  DEONTOLOGICAL TARGETING 
This part develops a normative theory of target verification based 
on the very moral asymmetries that the Balancing Approach ignores.  This 
normative theory, which I call ‘Deontological Targeting’, is developed in 
three stages.  Section A argues that it is impermissible for a soldier to 
intentionally kill an individual whom she believes is a civilian or whom she 
believes is probably a civilian.  Section B goes further, arguing that it is 
unjustifiable and inexcusable for a soldier to intentionally kill an individual 
whom she does not reasonably believe is a combatant.  Reasonable belief 
that an individual is a combatant constitutes a minimum threshold of 
certainty that soldiers must reach to permissibly use deadly force.  Finally, 
Section C argues that, due to the moral asymmetry between killing and 
letting die, a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual unless she is 
reasonably convinced that the individual is a combatant; is reasonably 
certain that the individual poses an immediate threat to a soldier or civilian; 
or reasonably believes that the individual poses an immediate threat to a 
substantial number of soldiers or civilians.  Section D compares 
Deontological Targeting with an alternative view proposed by Lt. Col. 
Geoffrey Corn.   
 
A.  THE INTENTION-BELIEF CONSTRAINT 
In the previous part I claimed that the moral and legal constraint on 
intentionally killing a civilian is violated when one intentionally kills an 
individual, believing her to be a civilian, and she is in fact a civilian.  
Importantly, to kill a civilian intentionally one need not kill the civilian 
because she is a civilian; it is enough that one believes that she is a 
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civilian.66  This understanding of intentional killing is supported by general 
principles of criminal law.  As Glanville Williams puts it, “[i]ntention is a 
state of mind consisting of knowledge of any requisite circumstances plus 
desire that any requisite result shall follow from one’s conduct . . . .”67  In 
the current context, the requisite result that must be desired is the death of 
the individual attacked, while the requisite circumstance the existence of 
which must be known is the fact that the individual attacked is a civilian.  
Similarly, the Model Penal Code states that “[a] person acts purposely with 
respect to a material element of an offense when . . . if the element involves 
the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such 
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.”68  Michael Moore 
puts the point even more strongly:  “The one simple truth is that the law 
nowhere requires true purpose with regard to such circumstances.”69  The 
same is true in international criminal law.70  On all of these accounts, to 
intentionally kill a civilian is to intentionally kill an individual whom one 
correctly believes is a civilian.   
                                                            
66 Obviously, some terrorist groups intentionally kill civilians because they are 
civilians; others intentionally kill civilians simply because they are vulnerable to 
attack and their deaths will spread terror.  Similarly, soldiers carrying out a 
campaign of genocide may intend to kill individuals because of their race, religion, 
ethnicity, or nationality, irrespective of whether they are civilians or opposing 
soldiers.  Nevertheless, if terrorists or genocidaires intentionally kill individuals 
correctly believing them to be civilians then, for both moral and legal purposes, 
they intentionally kill those civilians.   
67 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 20 (1965).   
68 Model Penal Code § 2.02(a).  See also Model Penal Code § 2.02 commentary at 
223 (“Knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is a common 
element in both [purpose and knowledge].”).  
69 Michael S. Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal 
Punishability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 179, 187 (R.A. 
Duff and Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).  See also id. (“This is certainly true of 
general intent crimes such as rape:  the actor need only know that the woman is not 
consenting, he need not be motivated by that fact (wanting only forced sex, for 
example).  But this is even true of specific intent crimes such as assault with intent 
to rape.”).   
70 See, e.g., Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law 
Perspective, 19 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 473, 496 (2008) (“Logically speaking, 
there is no offence which requires the prosecution to prove that the accused, in the 
true sense, intends a particular circumstance to exist at the time he carries out his 
conduct.”) 
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The structure of intentional killing provides moral and legal 
support for A.P.V. Rogers’s otherwise undefended assertion that “[a]t the 
very least, customary law would require those responsible for attacks not to 
attack persons or objects which they know or believe to be civilian.”71  
Customary law clearly prohibits intentionally attacking civilians, and 
intentionally attacking civilians just is intentionally attacking individuals 
whom one knows or believes are civilians.  
The prohibition on intentionally killing individuals whom one 
believes are civilians provides an outer limit to the Balancing Approach:  
one may not kill an individual whom one believes is a civilian even if there 
is some chance that she is a combatant and that sparing her will result in 
harm to one’s forces or mission.  However, this outer limit remains far too 
weak:  the prohibition would not apply to a soldier who ‘shoots first and 
asks questions later’ by attacking an individual without forming either a 
belief that she is a civilian or a belief that she is a combatant.  Such a 
soldier necessarily violates her legal obligation to distinguish civilians from 
combatants.  At a minimum, distinguishing civilians from combatants 
requires deciding, judging, determining, or concluding who is a civilian and 
who is a combatant.  In addition, soldiers are legally required to exercise 
‘constant care’ to spare civilians72 and are morally required both not to try 
to kill civilians and to try not to kill civilians.73  At a minimum, constant 
care to spare civilians and trying not to kill civilians requires deciding who 
is a civilian and who is a combatant.  In ordinary life you are often morally 
permitted to withhold judgment in the face of uncertainty.  But if the 
question is whether the individual you intend to kill is a civilian or a 
combatant, you are not allowed to keep an open mind.   
What moral and legal concepts best capture the culpability of the 
soldier who intentionally kills an individual without forming any 
affirmative belief regarding that individual’s liability to be killed?  It is 
tempting to say that such a soldier acts recklessly with respect to whether 
the individual attacked is a civilian or a combatant.  However, the concept 
of recklessness will not advance our understanding.  Recklessness 
generally involves the unjustified creation of a substantial risk; to find an 
actor reckless we must compare the risk she creates with her reasons for 
taking that risk.  In the current context, a finding of recklessness would 
involve comparing the risk of mistakenly killing a civilian with the risk of 
                                                            
71 Rogers, at 176. 
72 Id.   
73 See WALZER, supra note 80, at 155-56 (proposing a principle of “double 
intention”).   
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mistakenly sparing a combatant.  In other words, a recklessness inquiry 
would lead us back to the Balancing Approach we have already rejected.  
Even a recklessness inquiry that reflects the moral asymmetry between 
killing and letting die would still entail that it is permissible to intentionally 
kill an individual who is almost certainly a civilian if doing so might (but 
almost certainly will not) prevent a substantially greater (but not far 
greater) number of soldiers from being killed.  If that implication still 
seems implausible then the concept of recklessness cannot lead us forward.   
Alternatively, we could regard the soldier who attacks individuals 
without forming any belief regarding their legal status as morally 
equivalent to a soldier who attacks individuals believing that they are 
civilians.  This approach finds some support in modern criminal law.  
According to the Model Penal Code, “when knowledge of the existence of 
a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established 
if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes that it does not exist.”74  The drafters of the Model Penal Code 
believed that their understanding of knowledge ‘‘deals with the situation 
that British commentators have denominated ‘wilful blindness’ or 
‘connivance,’ the case of the actor who is aware of the probable existence 
of a material fact but does not determine whether it exists or does not 
exist.”75  Following this approach, we would regard a soldier who is aware 
of a high probability that an individual is a civilian, and who does not 
affirmatively believe that the individual is a combatant, as morally 
equivalent to a soldier who affirmatively believes that the individual is a 
civilian.  If the willfully blind soldier intentionally kills an individual, and 
the individual is in fact a civilian, then the willfully blind soldier is 
regarded as having intentionally killed a civilian.   
Taken to an extreme, the asserted moral equivalence of willful 
blindness and affirmative belief can erode the distinction between 
knowledge and recklessness.  If you believe that there is a low probability 
that a fact exists, but form no affirmative belief one way or the other, then 
it seems unfair to regard you as if you affirmatively believe that fact exists.  
However, if we take the requirement of a ‘high probability’ seriously, the 
asserted moral equivalence seems sound.  Specifically, a belief that a fact 
probably, or more likely than not, exists, absent an affirmative belief that 
the fact does not exist, seems morally equivalent to an affirmative belief 
that the fact exists.  At first glance, when an individual withholds judgment 
                                                            
74 Model Penal Code § 2.02(7).   
75 Model Penal Code § 2.02 commentary at 248.   
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regarding a particular fact, we may feel that she could just as easily 
conclude that the fact does exist or that the fact does not exist.  If her 
culpability would be significantly less if she were to conclude that the fact 
does not exist (in which case she might be reckless regarding that fact but 
would not know that the fact exists), then we may feel that we ought to 
give her the benefit of the doubt and treat her as if she had the lower level 
of culpability.  We essentially give her moral credit for the less culpable 
mental state that she could have formed but did not.  But this grant of moral 
credit would be inappropriate if she estimates that the fact probably does 
exist, because in that case it would be irrational for her to conclude that it 
does not exist.  It would be irrational for her to think “A is probably x, but A 
is not x.”  Specifically, it would be irrational to estimate that someone is 
probably, or more likely than not, a civilian but nevertheless form an 
affirmative belief that she is a combatant.  Withholding judgment should 
not mitigate one’s blameworthiness when one is rationally restrained from 
forming the less culpable judgment.  In such cases, withholding judgment 
is morally comparable to forming the more culpable judgment, which is the 
only judgment one could rationally form.  
We have therefore identified two plausible constraints on the 
Balancing Approach:  a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual 
whom the soldier either (i) believes is a civilian or (ii) believes is probably 
a civilian and does not affirmatively believe is a combatant.  However, 
these constraints remain too subjective and too weak: they permit soldiers 
to intentionally kill individuals whom they unreasonably believe are 
probably combatants, or whose probable status they have not even bothered 
to estimate.  The following section proposes a stronger, objective threshold 
of certainty that soldiers must achieve before using lethal force.   
 
B.  THE REASONABLE BELIEF THRESHOLD 
 In the preceding section we saw that soldiers may not intentionally 
kill individuals whom they subjectively believe are or probably are 
civilians.  The goal of this section is to show that soldiers may not 
intentionally kill individuals unless the soldiers reasonably believe those 
individuals are combatants.   
The reasonable belief threshold already has some basis in state 
practice and international court judgments.  For example, the US Naval 
Handbook states that “[c]ombatants in the field must make an honest 
determination as to whether a particular civilian is or is not subject to 
deliberate attack based on the person’s behavior, location and attire, and 
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other information available at the time.”76  In other words, soldiers may not 
intentionally kill individuals unless they sincerely believe those individuals 
are combatants.  This principle precludes soldiers from attacking without 
first forming an affirmative belief that an individual is a combatant.  
Unfortunately, the ‘honest determination’ standard permits a soldier to 
attack based on an unreasonable belief that an individual is a combatant.  
This standard is an improvement over the standards discussed in the 
previous section, but is also too subjective.   
The correct position was elegantly expressed by the Trial Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
when it wrote that “a person shall not be made the object of attack when it 
is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of the person 
contemplating the attack, including the information available to the latter, 
that the potential target is a combatant.”77  This principle precludes soldiers 
from attacking unless they both sincerely and reasonably believe that the 
individual attacked is a combatant.  Unfortunately, the Trial Chamber did 
not explain the moral or legal basis for its statement and its actual holding 
was more limited.78  Indeed, it appears that the Trial Chamber’s statement 
has been almost entirely ignored by courts, commentators, and scholars.79  
The argument of this section provides moral support for the Trial 
Chamber’s legal claim.   
At the most fundamental moral level, what makes the intentional 
killing of a civilian presumptively morally wrong is not that she is a 
civilian but that she is a human being.  The fact that an individual is a 
civilian does not give her any more rights or additional moral protection 
                                                            
76 United States, Naval Handbook § 830. 
77 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber 
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec.5, 2003), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf.  
78 The Trial Chamber held that it is a war crime to recklessly attack civilians.  See 
id. para. 54.  However, as we have seen in the previous section, a recklessness 
threshold replicates the very Balancing Approach we earlier rejected.    
79 Searches of Westlaw and Google indicate that the Trial Chamber’s statement has 
never been cited by another judge or examined by a single scholar, and has been 
quoted (without discussion) in only two sources.  See JENNIFER TRAHAN (HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH), GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITy 125 
(2006); ICRC, Customary IHL Database, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule1_SectionC; id. at http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule6; id. at http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule6_sectiond.   
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than she would otherwise enjoy simply in virtue of being human.80  Indeed, 
the crime of murder just is the intentional killing of another human being.  
It follows that, from a moral perspective, it is the intentional killing of 
another human being that a soldier needs to be able to either justify or 
excuse.   
What might justify a soldier in intentionally killing another human 
being?  Among other things, the fact that a human being is a combatant 
might justify intentionally killing her, because by becoming a combatant 
she may forfeit her moral right not to be intentionally killed and make 
herself morally liable to be intentionally killed.81  So international law, and 
much of just war theory, has it exactly wrong:  the fact that someone is a 
civilian is not a wrong-making feature of intentionally killing her; the fact 
that she is a human being is sufficient to make it presumptively wrong to 
intentionally kill her.  Instead, the fact that someone is a combatant is a 
wrong-justifying feature of intentionally killing her; by becoming a 
combatant she makes herself liable to be killed.82  It follows that it is not 
only unjustifiable to intentionally kill an individual whom you honestly 
(and correctly) believe is a civilian; it is also unjustifiable to intentionally 
kill an individual whom you do not reasonably (and correctly) believe is a 
combatant.   
                                                            
80 Cf. WALZER, 145 (“[T]he theoretical problem is not to describe how immunity 
[to intentional killing] is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune to start with; 
our right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships.”) 
81 The moral basis of liability to intentional killing in armed conflict remains the 
subject of profound philosophical disagreement.  See, e.g., WALZER (arguing that 
all combatants are liable to be killed because they pose a threat to opposing 
combatants and civilians); JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (2009) (arguing that 
only combatants who fight for an unjust cause are liable to be killed because they 
are responsible for an unjust threat to opposing combatants and civilians; in 
principle, civilians and prisoners who share responsibility for an unjust threat are 
also liable to be killed).  For my own view see Haque, Criminal Law and Morality 
at War, at 495-96 (arguing that combatants fighting for a just cause may defend 
themselves from opposing combatants who forcibly resist their achievement of 
their just cause; civilians and prisoners are never liable to be killed).  However, our 
topic is sufficiently narrow to avoid most points of controversy.  We are designing 
rules for soldiers who presumably believe that they fight for a just cause and who 
must decide whether to intentionally kill an individual who may pose or decisively 
contribute to a lethal threat to them or their fellow soldiers.  The proposed rules 
will remain sound on any plausible account of the moral basis of liability to 
intentional killing in armed conflict.     
82 For further discussion see Haque, Criminal Law and Morality at War. 
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But what if you intentionally kill a human being whom, it turns 
out, is not a combatant but instead a civilian who retains her ordinary right 
not to be intentionally killed?  You are not justified in killing her because 
she is not in fact a combatant.  However, you may be excused in killing her 
if you reasonably believe that she is a combatant.  If you reasonably but 
mistakenly believe that a justifying circumstance exists then your belief 
does not justify your action but generally it will excuse your action.  
Indeed, “the paradigm excuse is that one had a justified belief in 
justification.”83  Your reasonable mistake does not make what you did 
morally desirable, but generally it does render you moral blameless.  So, if 
you intentionally kill another human being then you have committed a 
presumptive moral wrong that you must either justify or excuse.  If you act 
on the true belief that she is a combatant, then you may be justified; if you 
act on the reasonable but mistaken belief that she is a combatant, then you 
may be excused.  Alternatively, we can say that action based on a 
reasonable belief in a justifying circumstance is permissible relative to the 
evidence even if it proves impermissible relative to the facts.84   
What, then, is a reasonable belief?  In general, a reasonable belief 
is a justified belief; a justified belief is a belief supported by undefeated 
reasons; and reasons are undefeated if they are at least as strong as any 
opposing reasons.85  It follows that a belief that a justifying circumstance 
exists is reasonable just in case the reasons to believe that circumstance 
exists are at least as strong as the reasons to believe that circumstance does 
                                                            
83 John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 444 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro 
eds. 2000) (“The contrast here is between having reasons for action and having 
reasons to believe that one has reasons for action.  It corresponds to the distinction, 
well known to all lawyers, between justifications and excuses.  One justifies one’s 
actions by reference to the reasons one had for acting.  One’s actions are excused 
in terms of the reasons one had for believing that one had reasons for action.”). 
84 See DEREK PARFIT, 1 ON WHAT MATTERS 150-51 (2011) (“Some act of ours 
would be wrong in the fact-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the 
ordinary sense if we knew all the relevant facts, . . . and wrong in the evidence-
relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we 
believed what the available evidence gives us decisive reasons to believe, and 
these beliefs were true.” ).   
85 See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 110 (2007) (“One must 
have an undefeated reason for one’s belief, and that moreover must be the reason 
why one holds the belief.”)   
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not exist.86  Conversely, a belief that a justifying circumstance exists is 
unreasonable if the reasons to believe that circumstance exists are 
outweighed by the reasons to believe that circumstance does not exist.  We 
can express the same idea by saying that it is unreasonable to believe that a 
justifying circumstance exists if you have reason to believe that the 
circumstance probably does not exist, or if you have most or strongest 
reasons to believe that the circumstance does not exist.  We can also see 
why generally we excuse actions based on reasonable but mistaken beliefs:  
although the actions are unjustified, the actions are based on beliefs that are 
justified, and generally we should not blame others for acting on the basis 
of justified beliefs.  Human beings have no choice but to act on the basis of 
beliefs that may prove false; if we act only on the basis of justified beliefs 
then generally we have done all that morality can reasonably demand.   
The defender of the Balancing Approach might nonetheless ask:  
Why isn’t it reasonable, and therefore excusable, to intentionally kill 
another human being, even if she is probably not a combatant, provided the 
number of lives you might save are substantially greater (though not far 
greater) than the number of lives you would take?   
The most straightforward response draws on the Kantian idea that 
generally it is impermissible to treat a person as a mere means to an end.  In 
my view, to harm a person as a means is to harm her in order to bring about 
some desired result or consequence.  To harm someone as a mere means is 
to harm her as a means when she has done nothing to make herself liable to 
be harmed as a means, for in that case you cannot justify harming her by 
reference to her own voluntary actions.  Finally, to treat someone as a mere 
means is to harm her as a means when you do not reasonably believe that 
she is liable to be harmed as a means.  If I intentionally harm one person to 
prevent harm to others then I harm the first person as a means.  However, if 
I reasonably believe that she is liable to be harmed then I do not treat her as 
a mere means.  By contrast, if I do not reasonably believe that she is liable 
to be harmed then by harming her to prevent harm to others I 
impermissibly treat her as a mere means.   
If the reasonable belief threshold is a general feature of moral 
justification and excuse, then soldiers can justify or excuse the intentional 
killing of another human being only if they act on an affirmative and 
reasonable belief that the individual killed is a combatant.  It follows that 
                                                            
86 See R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 267-68 (2007) (“A belief is justified if 
there are good reasons for accepting it, reasons at least as good as those for 
rejecting it; it is unjustified if there are no, or insufficient, reasons for accepting 
it”). 
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their reasons to believe that the individual is a combatant must be at least as 
strong as their reasons to believe that the individual is a civilian.  Put 
another way, soldiers cannot reasonably believe that an individual is a 
combatant if they have reason to believe that she is probably a civilian or 
have most or strongest reason to believe that she is a civilian.  The 
reasonable belief threshold therefore rejects the counterintuitive 
implications of the Balancing Approach discussed in Part II on the basis of 
a general moral theory of justified and excused action.   
Importantly, a well-trained soldier can form and act on reasonable 
beliefs rapidly and reliably under pressure.87  Military training already aims 
to sharpen situational awareness and streamline information processing so 
that soldiers immediately pick out relevant features of their surroundings 
and swiftly form judgments regarding their tactical situation.  No doubt, 
some soldiers will panic under fire and shoot anything that moves.  
However, we must not lower our moral, legal, and professional standards to 
accommodate soldiers overwhelmed by their circumstances; rather we must 
properly train soldiers to rise and meet otherwise justified standards even in 
the most difficult circumstances.  In addition, political leaders and military 
commanders should not place soldiers in tactical situations in which 
meeting justified standards will prove too much for too many of even the 
best-trained soldiers.   
*** 
The preceding moral argument for the reasonable belief threshold 
is supported by general principles of criminal law.88  However, three 
aspects of the criminal law governing justification and excuse warrant brief 
discussion.  First, leading criminal law scholars agree that a reasonable 
                                                            
87 It may be worth noting that a soldier need not think to herself ‘I believe that 
individual is a combatant for the following reasons . . .’ in order to believe that 
individual is a combatant for those reasons.  Reasonable belief does not require an 
internal monologue.    
88 See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 10.4 (2d ed.) (concluding that “the 
case law and statutory law on self-defense generally require that the defendant's 
belief in the necessity of using force to prevent harm to himself be a reasonable 
one, so that one who honestly though unreasonably believes in the necessity of 
using force in self-protection loses the defense.”); id. (“There is a little authority 
that an honest [but unreasonable ] belief in the necessity of self-defense will do . . . 
.  Only a few of the modern codes have adopted this position.”).  Similarly, a 
Canadian defendant pleading self-defense must believe, “on reasonable grounds, 
that he cannot otherwise preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm.”  
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 34(2) (1985) (Can.).  
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belief that a justifying circumstance exists provides a justification only if 
the belief is true but only an excuse if the belief is false.89  However, many 
jurisdictions do not systematically distinguish between justifications and 
excuses.90  As a result, many jurisdictions regard a defendant who 
reasonably but mistakenly believes that a justifying circumstance exists as 
justified rather than excused.  For our purposes, what is important is that, 
under either approach, an actor must reasonably believe that the justifying 
circumstance exists in order to escape moral blame and criminal liability.   
 Second, in most jurisdictions, a defendant who intentionally kills 
another person, whom she believes is liable to be killed, may be convicted 
of nothing if her belief is reasonable and but may be convicted of murder if 
her belief is unreasonable.91  In other jurisdictions, a defendant who kills in 
the unreasonable belief that the individual killed posed a lethal threat will 
be granted a partial or ‘imperfect’ defense and will only be liable for 
second degree murder or manslaughter.92  For our purposes, what is crucial 
                                                            
89  See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 762–69 (1978); 
JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 110 (2007) (“Thus the most basic or 
rudimentary case of non-technical excuse remains that of unjustified action upon 
justified belief.”); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a 
Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 271–73, 283–84 
(1975).  
90 Indeed, the Model Penal Code does not even recognize excuses as a distinct 
category of affirmative defenses, preferring to lump duress (an excuse) with 
complicity (a mode of responsibility) and entrapment (a bar to prosecution) under 
the capacious heading of General Principles of Liability.  See MPC art. 2.  See also 
Wayne LaFave, 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 9.1 (2d ed.) (discussing the MPC approach and 
concluding that “[i]n those instances in which the defendant is mistaken in his 
belief, what is called a justification would seem more properly characterized as an 
excuse”).     
91 See, e.g., LaFave, § 10.4 (2d ed.); People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 506 N.Y.S.2d 
18, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y.1986) (observing that this approach “provide[s] either a 
complete defense or no defense at all to a defendant charged with any crime 
involving the use of deadly force.”).  
92 See, e.g., Illinois Criminal Code § 9–2 (second degree murder); Pennsylvania 
Consolidated Statutes § 2503(b) (voluntary manslaughter); In re Christian S., 7 
Cal.4th 768, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574 (1994) (voluntary manslaughter).  
Similarly, under the Model Penal Code a defendant who kills in the mistaken belief 
that the individual killed posed a lethal threat will be liable for murder if that belief 
was formed due to extreme recklessness; manslaughter if that belief was formed 
due to ordinary recklessness; and negligent homicide if that belief was formed due 
to criminal negligence.  See MPC §3.09.   
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is that a defendant must affirmatively and reasonably believe that the 
justifying circumstance exists to escape moral blame and criminal liability.   
Finally, the reasonable belief threshold applies to ordinary 
individuals and government agents alike.  For example, law enforcement 
officers are justified or excused in using deadly force only if they 
reasonably believe that a justifying circumstance exists:  for example, that 
such force is necessary to defend themselves or others or to prevent the 
escape of certain dangerous suspects.93  Similarly, under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, “the use of force by agents of the State . . . 
may be justified . . . where it is based on an honest belief which is 
perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently 
turns out to be mistaken.” 94  Finally, in the United States a police officer 
acts unconstitutionally by using deadly force absent a reasonable belief that 
a fleeing suspect poses a threat to public safety.95  
                                                            
93 See, e.g., New York Penal Law 35.30(1); Cal. Penal Code § 835a.  Similarly, 
under the Model Penal Code, a law enforcement officer will be held criminally 
liable for using deadly force based on a recklessly or negligently formed belief that 
the relevant justifying circumstances exist.  See MPC 3.07 & 3.09(2).  Cf. 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., Standards for 
Law Enforcement Agencies 1-2 (1983) (italics deleted) (concluding that police 
departments must restrict the use of deadly force to situations in which “the officer 
reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life . . . or in defense of 
any person in immediate danger of serious physical injury.”). 
94 McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 ECHR 97 GC, para. 200.  See also id. para. 134 
(“The relevant domestic case-law establishes that the reasonableness of the use of 
force has to be decided on the basis of the facts which the user of the force 
honestly believed to exist: this involves the subjective test as to what the user 
believed and an objective test as to whether he had reasonable grounds for that 
belief.”) (citing Lynch v. Ministry of Defence [1983] Northern Ireland Law 
Reports 216; R v. Gladstone Williams [1983] 78 Criminal Appeal Reports 276, 
281; and R v. Thain [1985] Northern Ireland Law Reports 457, 462).  
95 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, at 21 (1984) (finding that police officer 
“could not reasonably have believed that [the suspect]—young, slight, and 
unarmed—posed any threat.”).  See also Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 969 (2008). 
(“Sincerely held but unreasonable belief does not justify the use of force under 
Garner, Graham, or our own precedents.”)  Although U.S. courts often use the 
phrase “probable cause” to describe the level of certainty required by the U.S. 
Constitution, courts have uniformly held that, when it comes to the use of deadly 
force, probable cause and reasonable belief are equivalent requirements.  See, e.g., 
___.  Certainly there is no indication that the U.S. Constitution permits police to 
intentionally kill fleeing suspects whom they do not reasonably believe pose a 
threat to the public.   
  
2012] KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR 42 
 
C.  ABOVE THE THRESHOLD 
Are soldiers who satisfy the minimum threshold and reasonably 
believe that an individual is a combatant free to fire at will?  They are not.  
Since a soldier’s reasons not to kill civilians are substantially stronger than 
her reasons to kill combatants, her reasons to believe that an individual is a 
combatant must be equally substantially (or proportionately) stronger than 
her reasons to believe that the individual is a civilian.  Put another way, 
since killing a civilian generally is substantially worse than allowing a 
soldier to be killed, it is impermissible to intentionally kill an individual 
unless the expected harm (that is, the possible harm discounted by its 
probability) of mistakenly sparing her is equally substantially (or 
proportionately) greater than the expected harm of mistakenly killing her.   
 For example, imagine that you are remotely operating a UAV and 
see several armed men on your monitor.  The men’s weapons, age, dress, 
and movements provide you with strong reasons to believe that they are 
insurgents.  However, demographic and cultural patterns provide you with 
strong reasons to believe that the men are civilians armed and organized to 
defend themselves and their community from insurgent attacks.  Suppose 
that, even if the men are combatants, they pose no immediate threat to 
anyone and it is highly unlikely that they will kill a substantial number of 
soldiers or civilians before being captured or killed in a future engagement.  
In such a scenario, it would be wrong to kill the men even if your reasons 
to believe that they are opposing combatants are as strong or slightly 
stronger than your reasons to believe that they are civilians.  
 What, then, should you do?  If possible, you should track the men’s 
movements and kill them only if new information provides you with 
conclusive reason to believe they are combatants; with much stronger 
reason to believe that they pose an immediate threat to a comparable 
number of soldiers or civilians than to believe that they pose no such threat; 
or with most reason to believe that they pose an immediate threat to a 
substantially greater number of soldiers or civilians.  Put another way, you 
should only kill the men if you are reasonably convinced that they are 
combatants; if you are reasonably certain that they are about to attack a 
comparable number of soldiers or civilians; or if you reasonably believe 
that they are about to attack a substantially greater number of soldiers or 
civilians.  However, if such time and resources cannot be spared to obtain 
additional information and reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians, 
then you must disengage and accept the risk of mistakenly sparing 
combatants.   
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 So, although a reasonable belief that an individual is a combatant is 
always necessary to excuse intentionally killing her, it is often not 
sufficient.  As the relative costs of a false negative decrease, one’s level of 
certainty must increase.  In other words, above the reasonable belief 
threshold the Modified Balancing Approach seems plausible:  the required 
level of certainty should vary with the relative costs of error, adjusted to 
reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die.  It is only 
below the reasonable belief threshold that even the Modified Balancing 
Approach loses its plausibility.   
 If we embrace Deontological Targeting and reject the Balancing 
Approach, must we accept that it is never permissible for a soldier to 
intentionally kill an individual who is probably a civilian (that is, whom the 
soldier has strong reasons to believe is a combatant but stronger reasons to 
believe is a civilian)?  Not necessarily.  So-called ‘threshold deontologists’ 
generally believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill an innocent 
person in extreme circumstances to prevent far greater harm to others.  
These threshold deontologists may also accept that it is permissible to 
intentionally kill an innocent person to prevent far greater expected harm to 
others (that is, the harm that killing her might prevent discounted by the 
likelihood that killing her will prevent that harm).  In other words, if it is 
permissible to intentionally kill an innocent person if the number of 
innocent people this would save exceeds some numerical threshold then it 
may be permissible to kill an innocent person if the expected number of 
innocent people this would save (that is, the number of innocent people this 
might save discounted by the likelihood that this would save them) exceeds 
the same numerical threshold.  It might therefore be permissible for a 
soldier to intentionally kill an individual who is probably a civilian to 
prevent far greater expected harm to others (that is, the harm killing her 
would prevent if she turns out to be a combatant discounted by the 
likelihood that she is a combatant).  However, since it is hardly ever the 
case that intentionally killing an individual who is probably a civilian will 
prevent far greater expected harm to others, the reasonable belief threshold 
is, for all practical purposes, absolute.   
 Significantly, Deontological Targeting entails that there may be 
cases in which it would be permissible to intentionally kill an individual 
whom one reasonably believes is a combatant to prevent substantially (but 
not far) greater harm to others but impermissible to intentionally kill an 
individual whom one has strong but not decisive reason to believe is a 
combatant to prevent substantially greater harm to others.  For example, 
suppose you receive reliable human and signals intelligence that a specific 
insurgent will open fire with a concealed firearm at a specific time and 
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location.  At that time and location, you see an individual whose facial and 
physical appearance closely matches that of the insurgent and whose 
clothing and behavior is strongly corroborative of an intended attack.  
Under such circumstances, if non-lethal options are not available, it may be 
permissible to attack the individual, even if such an attack would 
unintentionally kill two nearby civilians, to prevent substantially greater 
harm to others.  However, if you see three individuals who closely 
resemble the insurgent then even if you reasonably believe that one of them 
is the insurgent you cannot reasonably believe that each of them is the 
insurgent.  Under these circumstances, it would be impermissible to attack 
each individual unless doing so would prevent far greater harm to others 
even though in both cases you would kill one combatant and two civilians.   
This implication of Deontological Targeting may seem paradoxical 
but it should not.  By definition, every nonconsequentialist moral view 
holds that it is sometimes permissible to bring about good outcomes in one 
way but not in another way.  If the distinctions between intentionally and 
unintentionally killing civilians and between reasonable and unreasonable 
belief in justifying circumstances are morally significant then this 
necessarily entails that we are sometimes permitted to unintentionally kill 
civilians as a side-effect but not to intentionally kill individuals as a means 
whom we do not reasonably believe are combatants.    
 
D.  AN ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERED 
 In a forthcoming article, Lt. Col. Geoffrey Corn proposes that a 
soldier may intentionally kill an individual if the soldier either (a) 
reasonably suspects that the individual is a member of an opposing regular 
armed force or (b) believes based on a preponderance of the evidence that 
the individual is a civilian directly participating in hostilities.96  While I 
respect Corn’s military experience and appreciate the thought he has 
devoted to this difficult topic, I find his proposal very difficult to accept. 
For one thing, it is not clear why the required level of certainty that an 
individual is liable to attack should vary with the different possible bases of 
liability to attack (membership in an armed force, direct participation in 
hostilities, and so forth).  Of course, it generally will prove easier to satisfy 
the required level of certainty while fighting a regular armed force than 
while fighting an irregular armed group, since relevant information will be 
                                                            
96 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed 
Quantum of Proof Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual 
Reasonableness, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. __ (2012).    
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more accessible and less ambiguous.  But the required level of certainty 
should remain the same.   
On my view, a soldier may not intentionally kill another human 
being unless the soldier reasonably believes that human being is a member 
of a regular armed force, a civilian directly participating in hostilities, or 
otherwise liable to attack. Reasonable suspicion is not enough.  If you have 
reason to suspect that an individual is liable to attack then you should 
investigate further.  But if your reasons to conclude that an individual is 
liable to attack are outweighed by your reasons to conclude that she is not 
liable to attack then you are neither justified nor excused in attacking her.  
The reasonable belief threshold I defend may seem quite close to 
the preponderance of the evidence standard Corn applies to civilians 
directly participating in hostilities.  However, while the moral basis of the 
reasonable belief threshold lies in a general theory of justification and 
excuse, the moral basis of Corn’s proposal remains unclear.  For example, 
Corn writes that nothing less than a preponderance of the evidence can 
rebut the presumption that civilians are illegitimate targets.  However, the 
law is full of presumptions that can be rebutted by more or less than a 
preponderance of the evidence.97  Indeed, Corn himself writes that the 
presumption that civilian objects are not liable to attack can be rebutted by 
something less than a preponderance of the evidence, namely probable 
cause (which Corn defines as a ‘fair probability’) to believe that a civilian 
object has been converted into a military objective by its nature, purpose, 
location, or use.98  More generally, when we say that a soldier may not 
attack a civilian unless and for such time as that civilian directly 
participates in hostilities, we are not asserting an evidentiary presumption 
and describing the evidence that would rebut that presumption; rather, we 
are asserting a substantive rule and describing a substantive exception to 
that rule.  The pressing question is how certain the soldier must be that the 
substantive exception applies in a particular case before attacking a 
particular civilian.  The key to answering this pressing question lies not in 
the evidentiary concepts of presumption and rebuttal, as Corn suggests, but 
in the moral concepts of justification and excuse, as I have argued.   
                                                            
97 For example, in a criminal trial, the presumption of innocence can be rebutted 
only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.   
98 Corn writes that probable cause that a civilian is directly participating in 
hostilities is not sufficient to warrant intentionally killing that civilian because it 
“fails to exclude alternate probabilities—it merely creates one among several.”  Id. 
at [43].  However, preponderance of the evidence does not exclude alternate 
possibilities either—it merely identifies one as more probable than the others.   
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Finally, Corn makes no attempt to explain how the required level 
of certainty varies above the minimum thresholds he proposes, saying only 
that “a more demanding quantum may evolve over time as a matter of 
operational practice.”99  This is a serious limitation, since it would be 
wrong to intentionally kill a human being (who turns out to be a civilian) 
based on a bare preponderance of the evidence that she is a combatant if 
the costs of mistakenly sparing her (if she turned out to be a combatant) are 
very low.  For example, if an individual poses no immediate threat to 
anyone then it would be wrong to kill that individual if it is only slightly 
more probable that the individual is a combatant than that she is a civilian.  
As I have argued, reasonable belief sets a minimum threshold of certainty 
that soldiers must achieve before attacking any individual.  Moreover, 
above the minimum threshold of reasonable belief the required level of 
certainty reflects both the relative costs of error and the moral asymmetry 
between killing and letting die.   
 
IV.  DEONTOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY 
This article began with two questions:  First, how sure must 
soldiers be that an individual is a combatant rather than a civilian before 
attacking her?  Second, how much risk to herself, her unit, or her mission 
must a soldier accept in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing a 
civilian?  This part argues that the second question should be answered by 
reference to the first.  Specifically, soldiers must accept any personal or 
operational risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty.  If 
soldiers are unable to reach the required level of certainty, or if they are 
unwilling to accept the risks necessary to do so, then they must hold their 
fire, even if that forbearance will leave them at greater risk.   
The position that soldiers must take all necessary risks to reach the 
required level of certainty may seem demanding, but it follows logically 
from the discussion so far.  The required level of certainty already takes 
into account the cost of attack (that one might kill a civilian) and the cost of 
restraint (that one might spare a combatant who may kill one or more 
fellow soldiers).  If the required level of certainty is higher than the 
minimum threshold of reasonable belief then this means that the cost of 
restraint is less than the cost of attack.  If the cost of verification (that one 
might come under attack while seeking additional information) is greater 
than the cost of restraint, then the soldiers may choose the less costly 
option and hold their fire.  If the cost of verification is less than the cost of 
                                                            
99 Id. at [44-45].   
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restraint, then the cost of verification must also be less than the cost of 
attack.  Either way, the cost of verification cannot justify attack when the 
required level of certainty has not been reached.100   
Importantly, it is the responsibility of military planners to train and 
equip their soldiers to verify the legitimacy of their targets in the safest way 
possible.  Tactical and technological innovation can substantially reduce, 
though never eliminate, the risks involved in distinguishing civilians from 
combatants.  Undeniably, soldiers facing a non-uniformed enemy force will 
often find that reaching the required level of certainty will require 
accepting serious risks that they or their fellow soldiers will be killed.  In 
individual cases, accepting such risks will require soldiers to display 
tremendous moral integrity and psychological fortitude.  Over the length of 
an irregular conflict, accepting such risks will mean that a significant 
number of soldiers will be killed while attempting to verify the legitimacy 
of their targets.  The moral and strategic implications of such losses are 
obvious.  However, armed forces must not reduce or avoid such losses by 
inflicting comparable losses on the civilian population.  Instead, military 
commanders must train and equip their forces to reduce the risks of 
verification; prepare their forces to accept any remaining risks of 
verification; and, whenever possible, avoid placing their forces in situations 
in which the risks of verification are individually too difficult to bear or 
collectively too difficult to sustain.  As General David Petraeus observes, 
“to be brutally frank about it, if your overriding objective is to protect your 
own force, then you probably should not have deployed in the first place, 
because the only way to avoid risk to your forces is not to get involved.101    
                                                            
100 Rogers reaches a similar conclusion regarding air attacks on ground targets:   
If [an aircrew’s] assessment is that (a) the risk to them 
of getting close enough to the target to identify it 
properly is too high, (b) that there is a real danger of 
incidental death, injury or damage to civilians or 
civilian objects because of lack of verification of the 
target, and (c) they or friendly forces are not in 
immediate danger if the attack is not carried out, there is 
no need for them to put themselves at risk to verify the 
target. Quite simply, the attack should not be carried 
out.   
Rogers, at 179.   
101 Interview with Gen. David Petraeus, FRONTLINE: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, PBS 
(Feb. 19, 2008), 
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In addition to their specific obligation to take all necessary risks to 
achieve the required level of certainty, soldiers have a general obligation to 
take additional risks to obtain additional information regarding potential 
targets.  Soldiers who seek additional information regarding potential 
targets often increase the risk that they will be killed, while soldiers who do 
not seek such additional information often increase the risk that they will 
kill civilians.  As we saw in section I.C, according to the Balancing 
Approach, a precaution is feasible just in case the humanitarian 
considerations in favor of taking the precaution outweigh the military 
considerations against taking the precaution; a precaution is infeasible just 
in case the military considerations against taking the precaution outweigh 
the humanitarian considerations in favor of taking the precaution.  This 
suggests that soldiers need not seek additional information regarding 
potential targets if seeking that additional information would increase the 
risk to soldiers even slightly more than obtaining that additional 
information would decrease the risk to civilians.   
However, as we saw in section II.C, generally it is substantially 
worse for soldiers to kill a civilian than to allow a fellow soldier to be 
killed.  It follows that generally it is substantially worse for a soldier to 
increase the risk that she may kill a civilian than to increase the risk that 
she may allow a fellow soldier to be killed.  Therefore, a soldier must seek 
additional information regarding potential targets unless seeking that 
additional information would increase the risk to soldiers substantially 
more than obtaining that additional information would decrease the risk to 
civilians.  For example, if killing a civilian is at least twice as bad as 
allowing a soldier to be killed then soldiers must seek additional 
information regarding the legitimacy of their targets unless seeking 
additional information would increase the risk that soldiers will be killed at 
least twice as much as obtaining additional information would decrease the 
risk that the soldiers will kill civilians.    
Importantly, the two obligations described above—the specific 
obligation to take all necessary risks to achieve the required level of 
certainty, and the general obligation to take additional risks to obtain 
additional information regarding potential targets—are distinct and operate 
independently of one another.  The specific obligation reflects the relative 
costs of attack and costs of restraint, while the general obligation reflects 
the relative risks of attack and risks of verification.  The risks of 
verification can never justify attacking without the required level of 
certainty for the reasons described at the beginning of this section.  The 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha/interviews/petraeus.html#ixzz1e
Nb9b3CK.   
  
2012] KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR 49 
risks of verification can justify failing to obtain information that would 
further reduce the risk of attack to civilians, but only if seeking that 
information would further increase the risk to soldiers to a substantially 
greater degree.  Put the other way around, soldiers are obligated to further 
reduce the risks of attack if they can do so without a substantially greater 
further increase to the risks of verification.   
The general obligation described above is inspired by an important 
recent proposal by David Luban.102  Luban argues that soldiers must use 
more discriminating tactics (such as engaging with opposing forces in close 
combat) rather than less discriminating tactics (such as engaging with 
opposing forces from afar using artillery and air power) unless using the 
more discriminating tactics would increase the marginal risk to soldiers 
substantially more than using the less discriminating tactics would reduce 
the marginal risk to civilians.103   
My proposal differs from Luban’s in at least two ways.  First, my 
proposal is concerned with determining whether an individual is liable to 
attack (distinction), while Luban’s proposal is mostly concerned with 
determining how to attack individuals who are liable to attack 
(discrimination).  However, this difference is not dispositive, because both 
my proposal and Luban’s can be generalized to apply to all precautions in 
attack:  soldiers should take additional precautions to avoid harming 
civilians unless taking these precautions would increase the marginal risk 
to soldiers substantially more than taking these precautions would decrease 
the marginal risk to civilians.104  This general principle should guide both 
target verification and selecting means and methods of attack.105   
                                                            
102 David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, in READING WALZER (Itzhak 
Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 2011) 
103 Luban defines the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) as the difference 
between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers use more discriminating 
tactics and the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers use less discriminating 
tactics.  Id. at [20].  
104 In this context, the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) is the difference 
between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers take some precaution and 
the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers do not take that precaution.   
105 In the target verification context, the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) is 
the difference between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers obtain more 
information and the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers obtain less 
information.   
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The more important difference between Luban’s proposal and my 
own is that I ground the duty of soldiers to accept risks to themselves rather 
than impose risks on civilians on the moral asymmetry between killing and 
letting die, while Luban grounds this duty on “the vocational core of 
soldiering.”106  I suspect that professional obligation is an infirm point on 
which to balance risk to soldiers and risk to civilians.  Evidently, 
professional obligations are created, sustained, and defined by social 
conventions including laws, codes of conduct, and custom.  Yet the laws of 
armed conflict are indeterminate, rules of engagement vary with each 
armed force and each armed conflict, and state practice as a result remains 
unsettled.  Moreover, an armed force may opt out of whatever convention 
exists, rejecting the professional obligations associated with it, and 
construct their professional identity through a different set of norms, 
values, and ideals.107  Of course, defecting from a social convention can be 
a moral wrong in itself, if the convention has a compelling moral 
justification.108  However, the most compelling moral justification for the 
social convention that Luban supports is the moral asymmetry between 
killing and letting die.  
From a soldier’s perspective, the marginal risk to civilians is the 
marginal risk of killing the civilians, while the marginal risk to soldiers is 
the marginal risk of allowing them to be killed.  The risk is not simply that 
an equivalent harm will befall either a civilian or a soldier, but rather that 
the soldier will commit a more serious moral wrong or a less serious moral 
wrong.  Luban treats the death of a soldier and the death of a civilian as 
equally bad events, an equal loss of human life, and it is only the soldier’s 
professional obligations that require her to risk the former before risking 
the latter.  But this is misleading.  Killing a civilian is an action, not merely 
an event, and the moral weight of an action is a function not only of its 
outcome but also of its causal and intentional structure.  Soldiers should 
accept greater risks to themselves in order to avoid imposing smaller risks 
                                                            
106 Luban, at 28.   
107 Similarly, McMahan goes somewhat astray when he argues that “[t]he reason 
why combatants are required to expose themselves to risk in the course of 
defending those who are threatened with wrongful harm is simply that it is their 
job to do that: it is what they have pledged to do and are paid to do. It is part of 
their professional role.”  McMahan, at 366.  The goal of the inquiry is to determine 
what level of risk the role-based duties of soldiers should require soldiers to accept, 
and on pain of circularity this determination cannot rest on the role-based duties of 
soldiers to accept risk.   
108 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS 80 (2010).   
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on civilians, not because the lives of civilians are worth more than the lives 
of soldiers but because killing is worse than letting die.109   
 
V.  IMPLEMENTATION 
This part distills the complex moral principles defended in the 
previous parts into relatively simple rules that soldiers can be trained to 
follow even under fire.  Section A proposes new LOAC/IHL rules as well 
as reinterpretations of existing LOAC/IHL rules.  Section B translates these 
legal rules into model Rules of Engagement for training soldiers and 
guiding their conduct on the battlefield.  
 
A. LOAC/IHL  
The most elegant way to incorporate the moral principles defended 
in the previous parts into the LOAC/IHL would be for states to adopt three 
new legal rules either as part of a new international convention or as the 
basis for new customary international law.  The first rule would essentially 
codify the Galić dictum:   
[A] person shall not be made the object of 
attack when it is not reasonable to believe, 
in the circumstances of the person 
contemplating the attack, including the 
information available to the latter, that the 
potential target is a combatant.110 
In addition, a new rule could be adopted regarding the level of certainty 
required above the reasonable belief threshold:   
A person shall not be made the object of 
attack unless the risk to attacking forces of 
sparing that person, or the reasonably 
anticipated concrete and direct military 
advantage of attacking that person, is 
substantially greater than the risk that the 
person is a civilian.    
                                                            
109 Luban invokes the asymmetry between killing and letting die in a separate 
discussion of whether soldiers may unintentionally kill foreign civilians to prevent 
their own civilians from being killed, Luban at [33], but not to determine when 
soldiers may risk killing civilians to reduce the risk of being killed themselves.   
110 Galić, para. 50.    
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Finally, a new legal standard could be adopted to govern precautions in 
attack generally:   
Attacking forces shall take every effective 
precaution to spare civilians unless taking 
a precaution will increase the risk to 
attacking forces substantially more than 
taking that precaution will decrease the 
risk to civilians.   
These three rules would identify both the level of certainty that soldiers 
must achieve and the level of risk that soldiers must accept.  By following 
these rules soldiers can ensure that their use of lethal force will prove either 
justified (if the targeted individual turns out to be a combatant) or excused 
(if the targeted individual turns out to be a combatant).   
Alternatively, existing legal rules could be interpreted by states as 
well as by international courts to reflect the relevant moral principles.  As 
we saw in part I, Protocol I fails to specify either the level of certainty 
necessary to ‘verify’ that an individual or object is military rather than 
civilian or the level of risk that is ‘feasible’ for soldiers to accept in order to 
discharge their precautionary obligations.  The principle of verification 
could be interpreted along the following lines:   
Those who plan or decide upon an attack 
shall 
(i) do everything possible to verify 
that the persons to be attacked are not 
civilians but are combatants unless seeking 
additional information would increase the 
risk to soldiers substantially more than 
obtaining such information would 
decrease the risk to civilians;  
(ii) do everything necessary to 
verify that the persons to be attacked are 
more likely combatants than civilians;  
(iii) do everything necessary to 
verify that the persons to be attacked are 
sufficiently likely to be combatants that 
the risk of sparing them is substantially 
greater than the risk that they are civilians.   
These specifications reflect the complementary goals of error reduction and 
error distribution:  soldiers should gather as much reliable information as 
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they can without increasing the risk to themselves substantially more than 
they would decrease the risk to civilians; and soldiers must put themselves 
and their mission at as much risk as necessary to achieve the required level 
of certainty.   
 We also saw that the principle of doubt either fails to identify the 
standard of certainty relevant to targeting decisions, sets that standard too 
low, or permits the standard to vary without limitation based on the relative 
costs of error.  Instead, the principle of doubt should set a minimum 
threshold of certainty and allow the required level of certainty to vary only 
above that threshold:   
In case of doubt whether a person is a 
civilian, that person shall be considered to 
be a civilian unless there is reason to 
believe that she is probably a combatant; a 
person may be attacked only if any 
remaining doubt is sufficiently small that 
the risk of sparing her is substantially 
greater than the risk that she is a civilian. 
Similarly, the principle of apparent protection seems to permit a soldier to 
carry out an attack unless it becomes subjectively apparent to the soldier 
that the target is almost certainly not a combatant but rather a civilian.  This 
principle should be interpreted to require that, at a minimum,  
An attack shall be cancelled or suspended 
if there is reason to believe that the 
objective is probably not a military one or 
is probably subject to special protection. 
Interpreting existing LOAC/IHL rules along these lines will incorporate 
into international law the minimum threshold of reasonable belief 
applicable in all cases; the required level of certainty applicable when the 
threshold has been satisfied; and the level of risk required to avoid 
mistakenly killing civilians.   
 
B. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT  
The new rules and interpretations of existing rules proposed above 
enhance the determinacy of existing LOAC/IHL.  However, here as 
elsewhere the price of greater determinacy is greater complexity.  While 
military commanders and operational planners often will have access to 
legal advisors, we cannot expect soldiers under fire to apply complex legal 
standards to every targeting decision they make.  Instead, military 
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commanders should issue Rules of Engagement (ROE), written in ordinary 
language, which soldiers can be trained to apply in combat.  Such ROE will 
inevitably simplify the underlying LOAC/IHL rules, but such 
simplification is legitimate so long as soldiers will better conform to the 
LOAC/IHL rules indirectly, by following the ROE, than directly, by 
attempting to apply the LOAC/IHL rules under adverse conditions.     
In general, soldiers need just one rule:   
Don’t shoot anyone unless  
(a) you reasonably believe that he 
poses an immediate threat to several 
members of your unit or to several 
civilians;  
(b) you are reasonably certain that 
he poses an immediate threat to yourself, 
another member of your unit or a civilian; 
or 
(c) you are convinced that he is a 
combatant, even though he poses no 
immediate threat to you or others.   
In the vast majority of engagements, individual soldiers will make better 
decisions by following this ROE than by attempting to calculate the 
required level of certainty on a case-by-case basis, balancing military and 
humanitarian considerations adjusted by the moral asymmetry between 
killing and letting die.  By contrast, the teams of military and intelligence 
personnel who remotely operate UAVs generally have the time, resources, 
personal safety, and direct access to legal advisors needed to make more 
precise judgments and directly follow the LOAC/IHL norms proposed in 
the previous section.   
 Importantly, in special operations targeting a high-level combatant 
the long-term danger of sparing that combatant may be very high even if 
that combatant poses no immediate threat.  In such cases, it may be 
appropriate for commanders to issue mission-specific ROE permitting 
soldiers to intentionally kill an individual whom they reasonably believe to 
be that particular combatant even if the individual poses no immediate 
threat.  However, it is impermissible to intentionally kill an individual 
whom you do not reasonably believe is a particular combatant unless 
killing that particular combatant would prevent far greater harm to others 
before a better opportunity to kill that combatant arises.   
 The United States and its allies have issued ROE that substantially 
overlap with the ROE proposed above.  For example, ROE issued to 
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coalition forces in Iraq in 2005 provide that “Positive Identification (PID) 
is required prior to engagement.  PID is a reasonable certainty that the 
proposed target is a legitimate military target.”111  It is not clear, however, 
whether under this ROE “a reasonable certainty” requires soldiers to 
achieve a specific, moderately high level of certainty or merely directs 
soldiers to achieve whatever level of certainty seems reasonable under the 
circumstances.  Evidently, soldiers receive greater guidance when they are 
told what level of certainty to achieve than when they are told to figure out 
for themselves what level of certainty to achieve.  Moreover, a variable 
standard of certainty would introduce all the problems of the Balancing 
Approach directly into the ROE.  On the other hand, a single standard of 
‘reasonable certainty’ may prove too restrictive when the stakes are very 
high, too permissive when the stakes are very low, and too vague standing 
alone.  The proposed ROE is intended to give soldiers specific guidance in 
recurring situations, limit the inherent vagueness of language by situating 
each level of certainty in relation to the others, and not overwhelm soldiers 
with rules that are too fine-grained to apply under pressure.  Finally, the 
U.S. has permitted soldiers to intentionally kill individuals without 
positively identifying them as legitimate targets, for example in ‘free-fire 
zones’ from which civilians have been warned to leave as well as in 
buildings or areas declared ‘hostile’ prior to attack.  By contrast, the rules 
proposed above permit no such derogation.   
In his own work on targeting, Rogers proposes the following ROE:   
Are you sure that the target is a military 
objective?  If you are in any doubt, would 
you or friendly forces be placed in danger 
if the attack were not carried out?  If not, 
the attack is NOT to be carried out.112   
Though instructive, the ROE proposed by Rogers do not help soldiers who 
are not sure that a target is a military objective (that is, they are in some 
doubt) but who reasonably believe that friendly forces would be placed in 
some danger if the attack were not carried out.  How are soldiers supposed 
to balance substantial doubts against substantial dangers, substantial risks 
to civilians against substantial risks to soldiers?  Rogers does not say.  The 
ROE proposed by Rogers are silent not only with respect to the likelihood 
that the risks will materialize but also with respect to the magnitude of 
                                                            
111 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 516 (2010) (quoting MNC-I 
ROE Card issued to coalition forces in Iraq).    
112 Rogers, at 179.   
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those risks.  How much doubt is acceptable if many friendly soldiers would 
be placed in danger if the attack were not carried out?  Only a few?  Only 
oneself?  On all of these questions the ROE proposed by Rogers are silent, 
while the ROE proposed above offers meaningful guidance.   
Importantly, the proposed ROE is intended to guide, not replace, 
human judgment.  That is why, like all ROE, the rule proposed must be 
incorporated into Situational Training Exercises (STEs) in which soldiers 
are taught to apply their ROE in scores of realistic combat simulations.  In 
addition, like all ROE, this rule can form the basis of (real and 
hypothetical) case studies through which soldiers learn to recognize 
scenarios in which the use of force is, or is not, appropriate.  These 
exercises will clarify any linguistic ambiguities in the wording of the ROE 
and convert rules into reflexes.  Soldiers must often rely on pattern 
recognition as much as rule application, refined instinct as much as careful 
calculation.  So long as their training is grounded in sound legal and moral 
norms, soldiers can trust themselves to make legally and morally sound 
decisions even while under fire.113   
 
CONCLUSION 
This article began with two questions:  First, how certain must a 
soldier be that a given individual is a combatant and not a civilian before 
attacking that individual?  At a minimum, a soldier must reasonably believe 
that the individual is a combatant and not a civilian.  Above the reasonable 
belief threshold, the required level of certainty will vary with the relative 
costs of error and reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting 
die.  If an individual is not in a position to kill several soldiers or civilians 
then that individual may not be attacked unless the attacker is reasonably 
certain or even convinced that the individual is in fact a combatant.   
Second, what risks must soldiers accept to themselves and to their 
mission in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians?  Soldiers 
must take whatever personal or operational risks are necessary to reach the 
required level of certainty.  Soldiers must also seek additional information 
unless seeking additional information would increase the risk to the 
soldiers substantially more than obtaining additional information would 
decrease the risk the soldiers impose on civilians.  If soldiers are unwilling 
or unable to take the required risks then they must hold their fire.   
                                                            
113 See, e.g., Jørgen Weidemann Eriksen, Should Soldiers Think before They 
Shoot?, 9 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 195 (2010).   
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Unavoidably, this article has left several important questions 
unanswered.  How much worse is it to kill a civilian, intentionally and 
unintentionally, than to allow one’s fellow soldiers to be killed?  How 
should we compare harm to civilians with military advantages other than 
preventing harm to one’s fellow soldiers?  These are difficult questions that 
any morally serious approach to armed conflict must address.114  
Fortunately, the progress we have already made gives us reason to believe 
that these questions also have answers.   
                                                            
114 Among other things, proper application of the principle of proportionality 
depends on the answers.  See Haque, Proportionality (in War).  Elsewhere I have 
suggested that the value of a military advantage just is the resulting reduction in 
the losses to one’s forces necessary to achieve one’s overall war aims.  See Haque, 
Criminal Law and Morality at War.   
